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ABSTRACT
Legacy carriers developed hub networks to achieve a high concentration of
operations, increase frequency, and serve multiple Origin-Destination markets with
maximum efficiency. By contrast, the rapid emergence of low-cost carriers (LCCs) is
mainly based on a low-fare entry strategy in point-to-point markets competing with
the traditional connecting paths offered by the legacy carriers via their hubs. This
thesis examines the traffic and revenue impacts of an LCC developing a point-to-
point network in a legacy hub network environment. To this purpose, we use the
Passenger Origin-Destination Simulator (PODS) to perform all quantitative
evaluations. Modeling the choice of travelers with regard to flight schedules and
fares, as well as the airlines' revenue management systems, PODS allows one to
investigate the changes in aggregate and disaggregate airline statistics following the
introduction of low-fare service on point-to-point routes.
The first goal of the thesis is to review and update models of passenger choice
between connecting legacy and non-stop low-cost paths. The review of the literature
on air traveler choice provides parameters and benchmarks critical to the calibration
of PODS. We then simulate a LCC entry case, and calibrate the Passenger Decision
Model (PDM) embedded in PODS through sensitivity analysis. In the second part of
the thesis, we analyze the introduction of LCC operations in two legacy hub
networks, a theoretical symmetric and a more realistic asymmetric network. Two
different LCC strategies were considered. In the first case, LCC routes are added to
the legacy network with one daily frequency, while the second strategy is
characterized by two daily flights in each market entered by the low-fare airline.
For both networks and strategies, the analysis reveals that legacy revenues are
greatly reduced whereas the decrease in legacy traffic is limited even with extended
and aggressive low-cost competition, allowing the legacy carriers to maintain their
network load factors at high levels. The lower fares implemented by the LCC and
matched by the legacy airlines lead to the reduced legacy revenues. However, legacy
carriers can rely on demand stimulation, as well as great demand in local hub
markets and connecting markets not served by the LCC, to replace traffic captured
by the new entrant.
Thesis Co-Advisor: Dr Peter P. Belobaba
Title: Principal Research Scientist of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Thesis Co-Advisor: Dr Amedeo Odoni
Title: Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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1. INTRODUCTION
Because of the emergence of numerous and rapidly growing low-cost carriers (LCC),
legacy airlines are currently facing a very competitive environment. A significant
amount of traffic is diverted from legacy carriers as passengers are no longer
reluctant to book a flight with minimal or even no onboard service. Moreover, most
LCCs are building up their networks by operating point-to-point routes. While
virtually all legacy carriers rely on networks with at least one hub, point-to-point
operations represent a threat that may force legacy carriers to re-estimate the
economic viability of exclusively hub-oriented strategies.
Over the last decade, the performance of the legacy carriers has been affected by
the expansion of LCC operations benefiting from the competitive advantage of point-
to-point networks and a low-cost structure. First, operational efficiency and customer
convenience are enhanced by point-to-point routes, which tend to minimize turn-
around times, and maximize aircraft utilization and customer satisfaction driven by
shorter travel time. Second, the cost structure of LCCs provides them with pricing
power that led to a tremendous decrease in fares within the US air network since the
90's. Geslin' (2005) estimated the decrease in fares between 2000 and 2004 in
markets entered by low-cost carriers. She showed that fares decreased on average
by 31% in US markets where LCC operations reached the 10% market share level
between 2000 and 2004. Legacy carriers, who generally match fares to protect their
initial market shares, are put under the pricing pressure of LCC competitors.
The goal of this thesis is to determine the impacts of the entrance of an LCC in a hub
network operated by a legacy carrier. The effects of the entrance will be examined
both in terms of traffic and revenue. From a micro perspective, it will be determined
to which extent passengers prefer non-stop service to a legacy carrier offering higher
frequency in an Origin and Destination market (O-D market 2), and evaluate the
financial losses of the legacy carrier on the routes operated by the LCC as compared
to the initial level of legacy revenue. From a macro perspective, the analysis will
focus on the effects of an extended LCC entrance and their dependence on the
characteristics of the legacy and LCC networks. For instance, in the case where LCC
operations are limited to a small number of cities, one would expect the legacy
carrier to report smaller traffic losses in the O-D markets entered if the initial
demand for air travel is greater. As passengers book non-stop flights in certain O-D
markets, the negative impact on legacy traffic will be reduced if this decrease is
partially compensated by more bookings in other monopoly O-D markets served by
the same legs of the legacy hub network.
All quantitative evaluations will be performed by the Passenger Origin-Destination
Simulator (PODS) first developed by Hopperstad 3 at the Boeing Company. The use
of this simulator will not only allow us to obtain aggregate and disaggregate results
on traffic and revenues, but also to calibrate the decision of passengers facing a
1 Geslin, Pricing and Competition in US Airline Markets: Changes in Air Travel
Demand Since 2000, 2006, MIT Thesis
2 An O-D market is a city-pair composed of an Origin and a Destination on which
passengers choose between airlines and products (non-stop vs. connecting flight,
restrictions)
3 Boeing PODS, developed by Hopperstad, Berge and Filipowski, 1997
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choice between two radically different options, a low-cost non-stop flight vs. a legacy
connecting flight.
1.1. Thesis Goal
In this thesis, we will use simulation in order to investigate the potential impacts of
the further expansion of LCC non-stop operations on the viability of traditional hub
networks. As demand for air travel will surely increase in the future, hubs will remain
in the US air system at least to consolidate local demands. However, the legacy
strategy mainly focused on connecting operations may not remain as attractive as
originally in the context of fierce non-stop LCC competition.
By successively adding non-stop routes to a simulated hub network operated by a
legacy carrier, our objective will be to determine the impacts of LCC competition both
in terms of traffic and revenue. All simulations will be performed by PODS. After
some required calibration of the passenger decision model embedded in this
simulation tool, we will analyze the changes in traffic and revenue reported by both
carrier types as the number of markets entered by the LCC is modified. Since this
analysis intends to model the future expansion of LCC operations, we will emphasize
sensitivity analysis on some parameters such as the global air travel demand within
the network in order to account for variability in the future characteristics of the US
air transportation system.
1.2. Thesis Structure
The thesis consists of 5 main parts: the Introduction, the Literature Review, the
PODS Calibration, the Impacts of LCC Entry in a Symmetric Legacy Network, and the
Impacts of LCC Entry in an Asymmetric Network.
Chapter 1 includes an overview of the challenges faced by legacy carriers which are
struggling against the fierce competition of LCCs developing point-to-point
operations. We present the objectives of the thesis as well as the structure of this
analysis based on airline network simulations provided by PODS.
In Chapter 2, we present a literature review related to the historical and economical
factors that shaped the US airline industry from the 80's, and how the current rivalry
between LCCs and legacy carriers affects passenger travel choices in the 2 1st
Century. While most LCC operations are point-to-point and sustain low fares thanks
to a competitive cost structure, legacy networks remain hub-centered and struggle
to match fares without sacrificing profitability. As customer behavior is greatly
correlated to the level competitiveness and the products offered by the airline
industry, we will refer to recent scientific analyses that investigated passenger choice
with regard to air travel. This review will provide crucial parameters required to
calibrate the PODS simulator.
In Chapter 3, we will first describe PODS in detail. Both the Passenger Decision
Model and the Seat Inventory Control System will be emphasized and will shed light
on the need for calibration in the context of this analysis. Then, we will present the
characteristics of the networks used in the thesis. In order to gradually increase the
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complexity of the networks tested, two networks were developed. The first is
symmetric in terms of demand between spoke cities whereas the second is
composed of a greater number of cities served with non-homogeneous demand
levels. Finally, the PODS passenger decision parameters are calibrated to realistically
model the passenger choice between connecting legacy flights and non-stop LCC
operations. The modifications will be based on simulation runs and a literature review
providing estimates for crucial passenger disutilities, e.g. the disutility associated
with airline preference.
Chapter 4 presents simulation results related to LCC entrance in a symmetric
network. Based on the initial literature review on LCC entrance, we will describe a
base case defined as a reasonable scenario in terms of overall demand within the
network and fare decrease in the routes entered by the LCC. Then, the traffic and
revenue changes due the expansion of non-stop LCC operations will be analyzed
under these base case assumptions. As we intend to provide some insight on the
future of LCC competition against hub networks, we will also consider alternative
scenarios with different levels of air travel demand and LCC frequency to evaluate
the importance of these factors in the outcomes of the LCC entrance.
The structure of Chapter 5 is similar to Chapter 4 as it relates to the simulation
results for LCC entrance in an asymmetric network. The base case will be used as a
starting point of investigation and we will then modify these assumptions with regard
to air network characteristics and LCC frequency. Finally, we will assess the
performance of Revenue Management algorithms that may be implemented by the
legacy carrier to protect its market share more effectively. In the base case, both
carriers use the same optimization algorithm and we will determine to which extent
results change when this assumption is challenged.
Chapter 6 summarizes the findings of the LCC entrance analysis and suggests
directions for future research work.
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2. Literature Review
From the late 70's onward, a wave of deregulations has spread to the airline industry
worldwide, most notably in the US, Australia, Japan and the western countries in
Europe. The elimination of regulations in domestic markets and the more open-
market for international services is a continuing trend and two thirds of air travel
worldwide is expected to be liberalized by the end of the next decade4 .
In Chapter 2, we present a literature review that first illustrates the reshaping of the
US airline industry following the deregulation in 1978, and how the new regulatory
environment led to the expansion of hub networks in the 80's. Then, we will analyze
the recent evolution of the industry and emphasize the factors involved in the surge
of LCC operations over the last decade. Finally, we will focus on the current behavior
of travelers to understand how their decisions are influenced by the airline and the
product characteristics (flight time, connections, and departure time). Indeed, a
thorough customer behavior analysis is required to any modeling effort related to
passenger choice between LCC and legacy carriers, which will be a key stone of our
simulation environment presented in Chapter 3.
Following the 1978 deregulation, legacy airlines put a very strong emphasis on
developing their hubs for operational and economical reasons described in the next
section. Yet, for 10 years, legacy carriers have been facing the rapidly increasing
competition of LCCs expanding non-stop service within the US. Fares plummet and a
significant proportion of traffic is diverted from the traditional carriers which struggle
to break even. Indeed, 25% of the domestic US air traffic was carried by LCCs in
2004. In Section 2.2, we present the fundamentals of the LCC competitiveness, and
the future orientations of the US airline industry that will affect our modeling
assumptions in the next chapters.
2.1. The Post-Deregulation Expansion of Hubs
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 led to profound changes in the structures of the
US airline industry. Prior to deregulation, the Civil Aeronautics Board acted under the
provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act that limited de facto the competition between
incumbent airlines and the entrance of new competitors. To be granted a new route
award, an airline had to prove that its operations would benefit the public and would
not affect its competitors adversely. Moreover, the applicant had to provide the CAB
with good records of operations on other routes, which prevented most
entrepreneurs from starting a new airline. These restrictions were designed to build a
stable business environment for airlines that would as a result invest in high-quality
service and safety, and to ensure the financial profitability of these companies.
Indeed, fares were fixed by the CAB on a route distance criteria, and new route
awards were used as a mean to help financially weak carrier.
4 The Boeing Company, 2002 Annual Report
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Not surprisingly, rationalization and integration did not occur in the industry before
airlines were free to define their strategy by modifying their operations and achieving
economies of scale that one would expect from companies of significant size. Most
networks were linear, i.e. air carriers provided non-stop service between city pairs.
Some connecting flights were offered to travelers but these flights were not the focus
of the airlines in this period. The public would benefit from numerically many direct
servicess. However, large air travel service was often limited to major cities, flight
frequency was often low, and fares were very high due to monopoly control.
Following the Deregulation Act of 1978, the CAB changed its policy and procedures
to comply with the new law within only a few months. The new rules allowed the CAB
to grant an airline authorization unless incumbents could prove that new operations
would not benefit the public. This policy reversal led to a surge in applications and
new route awards. While only 24 000 authorizations were given by the CAB during
the regulated period, there were 106 000 city-pair authorizations within eighteen
months after the act became law.
As shown by the tremendous number of new route applications, airlines started to
reshape the organization of the American air network immediately. The industry as a
whole oriented its strategy toward the expansion of mega-centers of air
transportation where partial consolidation took place in the regulated period but
coordination lacked.
Kenneth Button5 presents the evolution of the networks developed by the US
airline industry from the 1950's onward. After deregulation, linear networks were
quickly modified and the Hub-and-Spoke structure was recognized as the best model
to achieve efficient allocation of resources, enhanced revenue flow, and better level
of service through higher frequency and increased capacity. Although networks were
rarely perfect examples of this hub model due to market specificities and remaining
regulation within the industry, hubs expanded and coordination was enhanced to
face growing traffic flows.
A key element of traffic flow coordination consisted of the introduction of bank times.
A bank time is defined as a period time, typically one hour, in which great numbers
of inbound and outbound flights are operated at a hub. The objective is thus to
maximize feasible connections for travelers. After deregulation, the wide use of
connecting banks improved quality of service due to increased frequency and a
greater number of routes served, which stimulated air travel demand and boosted
the development of hubs. In the 1990's, international air traffic met with a previously
unseen growth period fostered by airline strategic alliances. National flag carriers
were then willing to build networks in which all cities of the partner countries were
interconnected, which led to the inevitable creation of multi-hub networks.
s Kenneth Button, Airline Network Economics, Handbook of Airline Economics, 2nd
Edition
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Figure 1: Hub System
Figure 2: Multi-Hub System
Source: Kenneth Button, Airline Network Economics
The economic and operational advantages of Hub-and-Spoke networks have been
extensively investigated in the literature. In 1989, McShan and Windle6 estimated
the reduction in costs resulting from the concentration of operations at hub airports
between 1979 and 1984. First, they developed a new measurement of hub-and-
spoke routing by considering the proportion of an airline's most utilized (domestic
and foreign) leaving from the 3% most utilized airports (points served) in that
airline's network. For instance, consider a network consisting of 100 points served by
airline A, the hub-and-spoke routing measure will be the number of airline A
departures leaving its 3 most utilized airports divided by the total number of airline A
departures in a given year. Then, McShan and Windle analyzed cost reports of US
legacy carriers and concluded airlines costs diminished by 0.1% for every 1%
increase in hub routing.
6 McShan and Windle, The Implications of Hub-and-Spoke Routing for Airline Costs
and Competitiveness, Logistics and Transportation Review, Sep 1989, 25
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Besides, airlines took a great advantage of quasi-monopoly markets at dominated
airports. Borenstein7 explored the impact of hubs on market power in the US airline
industry and his regression analysis showed that hub structures result in higher fares
for travelers who want to fly to or from these airports. In a subsequent article,
Borenstein8 confirms these conclusions by an analysis of fare changes following the
wave of mergers in the mid-1980, focusing on the TWA/Ozark and
Northwest/Republic acquisitions.
Although hub networks might seem to benefit airlines primarily, they also led to an
increase in passenger welfare. On one hand, passengers originating and departing
from hubs experience higher fares but benefit from higher frequencies, greater
capacity and an extended network allowing them to reach a high number of
destinations on non-stop flights. On the other hand, connecting traffic benefits from
an extensive choice of destinations, lower connection time, and lower fares. Indeed,
Brueckner and al. 9 analyzed the changes in fares due to higher traffic densities in
an air network. Exploratory regressions showed that hub-oriented airline strategies
were far from collusive in O-D markets where connections via several hubs were
available. On the contrary, major airlines passed the cost reduction resulting from
hub concentration along to passengers, which raises passenger welfare.
In the end, hub operations increased both airline productivity and customer welfare
by rapidly extending airline networks and fostering competition for connecting O-D
markets. As a result, legacy hubs met with an expansion phase that remained
unchallenged for almost 15 years.
2.2. The Low-Cost Era
Whereas the expansion of hub operations was the keystone of US airline networks in
the 80's and early 90's, the competition of low-cost carriers is arguably the most
important factor shaping the present and the future of the airline business in the 2 1st
Century. While CEO's of legacy carriers are struggling with cost-cutting plans in
many countries, the low-cost airline sector is booming in emerging markets like
China and India, as well as in North America with JetBlue, Southwest, AirTran, and
the imminent run-up of Virgin America. In this section, we describe the key factors
involved in the success story of the LCCs, and the plausible scenarios for the future
of the US airline industry likely to remain the battle arena between legacy carriers
and LCCs.
7 Borenstein, Hub and high fares: dominance and market power in the US airline
industry, the RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 20, No. 3
8 Borenstein, Airline Mergers, Airport Dominance, and Market power, The American
Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 2
9 Brueckner and al., Economies of Traffic Density in the Deregulated Airline Industry,
the RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 23, No. 3
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a. The Low-Cost Model
The business model of LCCs is far from a recent innovation. Southwest considered as
a pioneer in the "no-frills" airline industry was launched in 1971. Gillel and Laill'0
presents an excellent synthesis of the sustainable competitive advantage of
Southwest against its legacy rivals. Operational simplicity is the credo, and the force
of this company that enhances productivity and sustains low prices.
First, the onboard amenities are reduced to a minimum, which reins in costs but also
alleviate the workload of crew staffs and speeds up turn-arounds at airports. The
expenses related to booking procedures are drastically limited by the extensive use
of online and internal website-based reservation systems. For instance, 80% of the
seats sold by Southwest were ticketless and 70% were sold directly by Southwest
website in 1999. Finally, the structure of the low-cost airline is also a key element of
its cost-controlled efficiency. Most LCCs including Ryanair in Europe use uncongested
airports of small cities or less congested airports of large cities. Thus, landing fees
are less of a burden, turn-around time is reduced and ontime performance is
improved. Connecting traffic is not emphasized but rather considered as a bonus due
to non-optimized network effects". Indeed, 70% of Southwest traffic was point-to-
point in 200010.
For the last decade, LCCs have used this cost advantage to attract customers with
low fares and boost their growth rate. A recent analysis performed by the Air
Transportation Association showed that US air fares decreased on average by 18%
from 2000 to 2004. These results corroborate the findings of Geslin with regard to
fare decrease in markets entered by LCCs in the same period'. In these markets, she
showed that fares were reduced by 31% between 2000 and 2004.
b. Scenarios for the Future of the US Airline Industry
Sustained by a surge in air traffic demand and customer demand for low fares, the
number of non-stop routes operated by low-cost carriers has grown at a quick pace
over the last decade and is likely to continue. The future entrance of Virgin America
that announced significant operations on the New York-San Francisco route from
2007 onwards confirms such a trend. Considering a significant fraction of O-D
markets in the US, Ito and Lee12 estimate the proportion of legacy carrier revenues
that may ultimately be exposed to LCC competition. By using probit entry models,
they found that the penetration rate could exceed 55% while the current revenue
exposure to LCC was only 32%.
10 Gillel and Lall, Competitive advantage of low-cost carriers: some implications for
airports, Journal for Air Transportation, Vol.10 (2004), 41-50
"' Perry Flint, "What's wrong with the airlines?", Air Transport World, May 1993
12 Ito and Lee, Low-Cost Carrier Growth in the US Airline Industry: Past, Present, and
Future, April 2003
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Moreover, the continuous growth of LCC operations will certainly be combined with a
change in the nature of markets entered by low-fare airlines. Until the mid-90's,
Southwest was exclusively focused on short and medium-haul routes between
uncongested airports leading to increased productivity. Boguslaki, Ito, and Lee13
analyzed the strategy of the most successful American LCC and showed that
Southwest re-oriented its entrance moves toward long-haul markets with a distance
greater than 1200 miles. As JetBlue serving many long-haul markets from New York
and Boston, Southwest modified its initial strategy, which consisted in entering short
and medium-haul markets served by legacy carriers only. As the number of these
markets diminished significantly in the 90's, Southwest now considers long-haul
markets as potential targets.
2.3. Passenger Disutility Costs
In the first sections of Chapter 2, we presented the respective characteristics of
legacy carriers and LCCs, which offer significantly different products but compete for
the same passengers in O-D markets. The preliminary literature review indicates the
level of LCC exposure in the US airline industry for the foreseeable future as well as
the magnitude of the fare decrease in markets entered by LCCs. Eventually, these
values will be integrated in our model to build realistic LCC entrance cases.
Besides network characteristics and airline strategies, the passenger behavior related
to our specific competition case needed to be addressed by a complementary
literature review. Indeed, we will perform all quantitative evaluations with the
Passenger Origin-Destination Simulator (PODS). In Chapter 3, the structure of this
simulator will be described, and we will see that it relies on two major components,
which are the passenger decision model and the seat inventory control system.
Because the PODS environment requires any disutility cost attributed by passengers
to booking characteristics to be an input, such as the number of connections or the
airline associated with the booking, the review of previous estimates of these
disutility costs will allow us to calibrate these parameters consistently.
In 1999, Proussaloglou and Koppelman" conducted a customer survey and built
a three-dimensional choice context designed to evaluate the passenger choice of
carrier, flight and fare class. The data collection based on air traveler's reported
choices allowed Proussaloglou and Koppelman to determine the values attributed by
air travelers to schedule delay and frequent-flyer membership. In the literature,
schedule delay refers to the difference between the preferred departure time of a
passenger and the actual flight departure time. It is defined as a measure of
schedule convenience and can be attributed a monetary value. Indeed, a passenger
is willing to pay an extra amount of money if the flight departure time is closer to his
preferred time. In Table 1, the results show that business and leisure passengers are
respectively willing to pay $60 and $17 to book on a flight with a departure time one
hour closer to their preferred time.
13 Boguslaki, Ito, and Lee, Entry Patterns in the Southwest Airlines Route System,
Review of Industrial Organization, Vol.25 (2004), 317-350
14 Proussaloglou, Koppelman, The Choice of Air Carrier, Flight and Fare Class, 1999
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Value of Schedule
Delay
Business Travelers $60
Leisure Travelers $17
Table 1: Estimated Value of Schedule Delay by Hour
Then, Proussaloglou and Koppelman estimated the values attributed by air travelers
to frequent-flyer membership. Indeed, any passenger participating in such a
program will be willing to pay an extra amount of money for flying his preferred
airline to earn frequent-flyer miles. Table 2 summarizes the findings of the analysis
and shows that the value of frequent-flyer membership depends on both the
passenger type and his level of commitment. For instance, a business passenger who
travels frequently will be willing to pay an extra $72 for a flight operated by the
airline running the frequent-flyer program he participates in. These values are
particularly relevant to traveler's choices between LCC and legacy flights and will be
used to calibrate the passenger decision model embedded in the PODS simulator.
Business Leisure
Member $21 $7
Active member - all $52 $18travelers
Active member - $72 $26frequent travelers
Table 2: Estimated Value of Frequent-Flyer Membership
Adler, Falzarano and Spitz" also provide estimates of a wide range of disutility
costs including the effects of flight time, on-time performance, aircraft type, schedule
time difference, airline ranking and number of connections. Unlike the analysis of
Proussaloglou and Koppelman, this research project is based on a mixed logit
approach using stated preference survey data for the development of an itinerary
choice model, which can determine all values of service attributes. Compared to the
logit model created by Ben-Akiva and Lerman'" in the 80's and its further
developments that are incorporated into the GEV family of discrete models, a mixed
logit model accounts for variations in individual and context preferences. Thus, the
researcher has the possibility to consider a disutility cost either as a fixed parameter
or as a variable with a given distribution, usually normal or lognormal for fixed-sign
parameters. The mixed logit model provides estimates for the mean and the
variation of these pre-defined distributions.
1s Adler, Falzarano and Spitz, Modeling Service Trade-offs in Air Itinerary Choices,
2004
16 Ben Akiva M.E., Lerman S. R., Discrete Choice Analysis: Theory and Application to
Travel Demand, 1985, MIT Press, Cambridge
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The analysis is based on an annual online survey of US domestic travelers conducted
from 2000 to 2002. The survey was administered to approximately 600 individuals
and collected detailed information on the traveler such as his membership level in
frequent flier programs and his travel preferences. The traveler was then presented a
scenario and a set of choices that would be analyzed to estimate the values
attributed to flight characteristics such as the associated number of connections.
Tables 3 and 4 presents the estimates that will affect the calibration of the passenger
decision model embedded in PODS.
Mean ($) Standard Deviation I
Flight time (/hr.) 69.7 39.2
Number of 53.7 48.5Connections
Schedule Delay (/hr.) 30.3 22.9
Airline Preference
Preferred Airline vs. 96.1 55.9
Lowest Ranked
Table 3: Business Trip Disutility Costs Distributions for Basic Service Variables
Mean ($) Standard Deviation
Flight time (/hr.) 31.2 23.2
Number of 18.8 23.3Connections
Schedule Delay (/hr.) 4.8 5.7
Airline Preference
Preferred Airline vs. 37.8 36.4
Lowest Ranked
Table 4: Leisure Trip Disutility Costs Distributions for Basic Service Variables
The schedule convenience model adopted by Adler and al. is similar to the
Proussaloglou and Kopelmann model, i.e. each passenger has supposedly a preferred
departure time and is willing to pay an extra amount of money for a flight departing
closer to his optimal time. On average, a business traveler is willing to pay $30.3
more for a flight departing one hour closer to his preferred time. Then, travelers
attribute values to the total amount of flight time and the number of connections,
which are both proportionally related to flight inconvenience. In Table 4, the results
show that a leisure passenger is willing to pay on average an extra $31.2 for a flight
with a one hour shorter duration and $18.8 for a flight with one less connection.
Finally, Adler and al. confirmed that travelers are willing to pay more for flying on
their preferred airline. Several factors including frequent-flyer programs, and brand
image that may also be related to safety, affect the value of this disutility cost. Table
3 shows that a business passenger is willing to pay on average $96.1 more for a
ticket on his favorite airline as opposed to his least preferred airline.
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In Chapter 3, we will use the values of disutility costs estimated by the previous
analyses both directly and indirectly. We will directly implement some of these
values as input in PODS. Indirectly, we will use these scientific estimates to fix the
ratio of the disutility costs between leisure and business demand, and check the
consistency of our values determined by sensitivity analyses as explained in the next
chapter.
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3. PODS SIMULATION
Chapter 3 describes the Passenger Origin-Destination Simulator (PODS) that was
used to obtain statistical reports on traffic and revenue generated by the carriers in
the network, as well as the calibration of the simulator. The thesis is focused on the
specific LCC entrance scheme involving non-stop flights, which requires calibrating
the behavior of passengers accordingly.
The first two sections will be a review of the concepts and subtleties related to PODS
as it was described in detail by Zickus, Gorin and Carrier17 . The reader should
refer to these materials for a complete description of the simulator.
In the third section, we will focus on the calibration process. These adjustments are
primarily based on the literature review of Chapter 2 that will provide direction with
respect to realistic scenarios to be tested in the thesis, and parameters such as
disutility costs. Moreover, we will present the results of a previous analysis that give
some benchmarks in terms of market shares that can be expected from a LCC
entrance scenario. Indeed, benchmarks will play a key role in the calibration process
as it requires adjusting subtle parameters for which data cannot easily be found and
estimated values are too reliant on the airline competition case chosen for the sake
of the analysis.
3.1. PODS Overview
In the thesis, all simulation results will be performed by the Passenger Origin-
Destination Simulator (PODS) that was originally developed by Hopperstad, Berge
and Filipowski 3 at the Boeing Company in the mid 90's. Further development was
then initiated by the PODS Consortium, a partnership between MIT and seven
international airlines. The objective of the PODS Consortium is to use a realistic
simulator environment to test revenue management (RM) systems in different
competitive configurations, as well as to assess the performance of innovative
methods related to demand forecasting and RM algorithms.
17 Zickus, Forecasting for Airline Network Management; Revenue and Competitive
Impact, 1998
Gorin, Airline Revenue Management: Sell-up and Forecasting Algorithms, June 2000
Carrier, Modeling Airline Passenger Choice: Passenger Preference for Schedule in the
Passenger Origin-Destination Simulator (PODS), 2003
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PODS simulates an air transportation network composed of airlines interacting with
passengers willing to travel from an origin to a destination. The simulator models the
booking process associated with each flight operated within the network on a same
departure day. The process starts 63 days before the scheduled departure and is
divided into 16 timeframes that are used by the airlines to update their seat
inventory strategy. In each O-D market served, a daily demand is generated and
given characteristics such as its distribution over the booking period (63 days).
Based on this demand, passengers are generated and given individual
characteristics, e.g. the value they attribute to a non-stop as compared to a
connecting flight. Finally, the same passengers request bookings and cancellations,
and airlines interact with travelers by accepting or rejecting these requests.
PODS runs as an iterative process by performing the simulation described in the
previous paragraph multiple times. Indeed, a PODS run consists of several "trials"
which are composed of hundreds of booking simulations called "samples"
corresponding to one same departure day. Because seat inventory control relies on
historical bookings, PODS reiterates all these booking processes for the same
departure day numerous times. Moreover, iterations are divided into "trials", i.e.
independent groups of iterations, so that all simulation results are not correlated.
Under the current settings, a PODS run consists of
successive simulations for the same departure day.
5 trials, each composed of 600
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PASSENGER
CHOICE
MODEL
-....................................---
Path/Class
Availability
Path/Class
Bookings/
Cancellations
REVENUE
MANAGEMENT
SEAT INVENTORY
CONTROL
-- ---- ------------------------------------------
Current Future
Bookings gs Bookings
FORECASTER
Update Historical
I t Bookings
HISTORICAL
BOOKING
DATABASE
Figure 3: PODS Architecture (Courtesy of Hopperstad)
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Figure 3 shows the PODS architecture which consists of 4 main parts. For each
sample, demand is generated and passenger decision processes are simulated by the
Passenger Choice Model, which determines the preferred paths and classes of each
passenger according to his personal criteria. Then, the RM Seat Inventory Control
system of the airline will accept or reject the requests of passengers, which always
have the alternative to book no flight. The airline decision is based on optimization
algorithms embedded in the RM system that will be detailed in Section 3.2.c, and the
forecasts provided by the Forecaster. These booking forecasts by fare class are
estimates of future bookings, and depend on several variables including the current
number of bookings in each class, updated at each timeframe, and the historical
bookings for this flight provided by the Historical Booking Database.
PODS modules can be divided into two separate groups respectively related to
passenger choice and airline decision. We will dedicate Section 3.2 to specifically
describing the Passenger Choice Model generating demand and customer
preferences. In Section 3.3, we will present the networks, fare structures,
forecasting methods and RM algorithms specific to the thesis.
3.2. Passenger Choice Model
a. Network Inputs
Passenger booking requests will depend on the characteristics of the network
implemented in PODS, which are as follows:
> Number of airlines
> Airline Preference Index 8 of each airline
> Number of Origin-Destination markets
> Departure time, Arrival time, and Capacity of each leg
> Path Quality Index (PQI' 9) of each path
> Number of fare classes with associated fares, base fares 20, advance purchase
requirements and other restrictions (i.e. Saturday Night Stay requirement,
non-refundability and change fee)
b. Passenger Choice Model
For each sample, the Passenger Choice Model will simulate traveler choices with
regard to path preferences by following the process presented in Figure 4.
18 Disutility costs associated with airline preference may be implemented in PODS
(see Section 3.2.d)
19 PQI refers to the number of connections associated with a given path. The higher
the PQI, the greater the number of connections and the higher the disutility costs
associated with this path (see Section 3.2.d)
20 Base fares determine demand as demand inputs are defined at base fares (see
Section 3.2.c)
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Demand generation by market and
passenger type
Distribution of generated demand over
booking period (63 days)
Generate individual
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Figure 4: Passenger Choice Model Process
The Passenger Decision Model requires a specific set of inputs related to demand.
Mean market demands and passenger characteristics can be customized according to
the researcher preferences. Since PODS takes into account the stochasticity of air
travel demand, all parameters required to calibrate passenger choices are defined by
a mean value and a standard deviation. These inputs include:
> Average demand by O-D market and passenger type
> Arrival curves by passenger type. They are required to distribute generated
demand over the booking period, and translate the fact that leisure
passengers generally book earlier that business travelers. Arrival curves are
presented in Figure 5
> Parameters involved in passenger willingness-to-pay
> Average disutility costs associated with connections, airline preference,
restrictions, and replanning. These disutility costs allow the Passenger
Decision Model to compare all flights in a given O-D market from the
passenger perspective and pick up the path minimizing his disutility
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The modeling of randomness in passenger choice is a key achievement in PODS.
While mean values of demand and disutility are chosen by the researcher, standard
deviation are computed assuming these variables follow normal distributions with a
0.3 k-factor", typical of air transportation demand according to marketing research
conducted by Boeing.
100/0
l0'00
60%
-- Business Pax
40% -- Wire Pax
0%
60 50 40 30 20 10 0
4%toDeparue
Figure 5: Arrival Curves by Passenger Type
c. Demand Generation
For each sample, the first step performed by the Passenger Choice Model is to
generate a demand for each market and each passenger type. These demand levels
change between samples to account for the stochasticity of air travel demand. The
mean demand values are PODS inputs set by the researcher and actual demand
follows a Gaussian distribution with a 0.3 k-factor.
Air travel demand is not a pure function of macroeconomic factors such as the size of
the cities served by the route, and the average income in these cities. Demand
modeling must also take into account the elasticity of the demand with regard to
price levels, which PODS simulates. Indeed, market demand is defined at "base
fares". For each market, the input includes a set of two base fares (one by passenger
type) that define the fares at which respectively 100% of business and leisure
passengers are willing to buy a flight ticket.
Usually, the lowest fare available in a given market is very close to the leisure base
fare, and the business base fare is equal to 2.5 the leisure base fare. In this case,
actual demand is equal to the number picked up by the Passenger Choice Model for
each sample based on the mean demand input value. Indeed, the lowest available
fare class will always be equal or greater than base fares. However, a decrease in
fares will result in a demand increase as more passengers are willing to pay for very
low fares (see Section 3.2.d). Therefore, we will refer to mean demand level as
"mean base fare demand".
21 k-factor refers to a normal distribution with the following relation between the
mean value p and the standard deviation a, i.e. a = (k-factor)*p
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d. Passenger Characteristics
1) Willingness-to-Pay
Each passenger entering the booking process gets assigned a willingness-to-pay
which is defined as the maximum amount of money he will be willing to pay for a
ticket. This willingness-to-pay refers only to fares and not to the generalized cost of
a flight ticket, which is computed in PODS to simulate trade-offs between different
travel options.
Willingness-to-pay is randomly assigned to any passenger by the Passenger Decision
Model (PDM) but this assignment process reproduces aggregate willingness-to-pay
curves embedded in the model. Since leisure and business have inherently different
properties, two curves are implemented in the PDM. The equations of the
willingness-to-pay curves are the following:
6931 * ( f- basefare)P (pay at least f, business passenger) = min[l, exp(- (1 f)-basefare)](emult - 1)* basefare
P (pay at least f, leisure passenger) = exp(- (1 ))*basefare
(emult - 1) * basefare
Where f = fare in question
Basefare = fare at which all travelers would travel (business
basefare=2.5*leisure basefare)
e-mult = elasticity multiplier (of the basefare where 50% of travelers are
willing to travel). These parameters are respectively calibrated to 3.0 and 1.2
for business and leisure passengers
In the previous section, we explained how demand levels are input in PODS and
defined with reference to the willingness-to-pay model and the base fares by
passenger type. The two equations of willingness-to-pay curves reveal the
implementation of demand stimulation in PODS. Indeed, more than 100% of leisure
base fare demand will be willing to pay for a lower fare than the leisure base fare.
This proportion reflects the increase in demand due to lower fares and may lead to
simulation reports where the average number of bookings will be greater than the
"mean base fare demand" for a given market and a passenger type.
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the willingness-to-pay curves and the demand stimulation
effect. Both charts refer to the same market operated by the same airline with
different sets of fares. Fares are shown on the x-axis. The second chart presents a
case where fares are decreased by 10% as compared to the price levels of Figure 6.
As shown by Figure 7, the number of leisure passengers willing to pay for the lowest
fare is equal to about 1.8 the mean base fare leisure demand when all fares are
decreased by 10%.
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Figure 6: Willingness-to-Pay Curves with Initial Fares
WTP
180%
150% Leisure Business
Base Fare Base Fare
100%
50% ---.-.-
500%
0% Fare $
$108 $151 $268 $367
Figure 7: Willingness-to-Pay Curves with Decreased Fares
(No Change in Base Fares)
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Each passenger will be assigned a willingness-to-pay that will fix the maximum
budget allocated to his travel. Then, the Passenger Decision Model will compute the
generalized cost of each path for each fare class to simulate the trade-offs performed
by the passenger while reserving his trip. The reader should refer to Lee 2 2 to get
more precise information on the calibration of disutility costs in PODS. In the end,
the passenger will book the available fare-path combination with the lowest
generalized cost and a fare lower than his willingness-to-pay, if any.
Total Generalized Cost = OD Fare + (disutility- costs)
2) Passenger Decision Window
Besides his random willingness-to-pay, any passenger entering the booking process
is assigned a preferred decision window. This model is directly inspired from the
Decision Window Model23, and refers to the passenger window which the
customer would prefer to depart and arrive within. The position and the size of the
decision window is a function of the flight elapsed time and the passenger type. For
further reference, the reader should refer to Carrier 17.
To account for passenger trade-offs related to schedule convenience, the "replanning
disutility" was introduced in the PDM. Thus, a fare-path outside the passenger's
decision window will be considered by this passenger as a reasonable travel option,
but the associated generalized cost will be incremented by the replanning disutility
costs specific to this passenger. Like all PODS disutilities, the mean value by
passenger type is a PODS input with a Gaussian distribution and a 0.3 k-factor.
3) Restriction Disutility Costs
In PODS, 3 types of restriction are implemented: Saturday Night Stay requirement,
non-refundability and change fee. A set of restrictions applies to each fare class in
each market and the total generalized cost of the fare-path will be incremented by
the disutility costs associated with the restrictions applying to the fare class, if any.
As replanning disutility costs, restriction disutility values are smaller for leisure
passengers than for business passengers on average. Since the Saturday Night
requirement is the most difficult requirement to meet for both business and leisure
passengers, the associated disutility costs are greater than for the two other
restrictions.
22 Lee, Modeling Passenger Disutilities in Airline Revenue Management Simulation,
1998, MIT Thesis
23 The Boeing Company, Decision Window Path Preference Model, Copyright 1993
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4) Disutility Costs Associated with a Connecting Path
The set of PODS network inputs includes a Path Quality Index (PQI) for each path
that determines the number of legs associated with this path. Therefore, PQI is
directly related to the number of connections of a path that is equal to (PQI-1). For
instance, a path with a PQI equal to 2 must be a connecting path with one
connection between the two corresponding legs. As passengers prefer non-stop as
opposed to connecting paths, a disutility cost associated with the number of
connections was introduced in the PDM. For each fare-path, the generalized cost is
incremented by the connection disutility cost multiplied by PQI. This disutility cost is
specific to the traveler, but the mean disutility value is a PODS input and the
distribution is Gaussian with a 0.3 k-factor.
5) Utility Costs Associated with Airline Preference
The airline preference disutility was introduced in PODS to model the competition
between airlines with different level of service, which is particularly relevant to our
analysis investigating the expansion of low-cost carriers in a legacy environment.
The set of network inputs includes an Airline Preference Index (API) for each airline
operating within the network. This coefficient is a constant across the network, and is
either equal to 1 or 0. The preferred airline is designated by 1 while the other carrier
is designated by 0. In the end, the generalized costs of all fare-path of the preferred
airline will be reduced by the airline preference utility value specific to the passenger.
On average, airline preference disutility costs are much greater for business than for
leisure passengers. Like all PODS disutilities, the mean value by passenger type is a
PODS input with a Gaussian distribution and a 0.3 k-factor.
6) Example
Let X be a passenger willing to travel from LAX to JFK. Mr. X is a leisure passenger
with a low willingness-to-pay ($150) so we will consider only the lowest existing
fares on this route. Given the network implemented in PODS, X has two travel
options. Both paths are connecting flights since the two airlines are legacy carriers
exclusively operating major hubs. These two airlines have recently decided to
remove the Saturday Night Stay requirement from all their fare classes, but non-
refundability and change fee apply to the fare class Mr. X is interested in. The first
option would be to fly his preferred airline, airline 1, but unfortunately the flight is
outside his decision window between 10am and 6pm (LAX local time). The
alternative would be to fly airline 2 with a flight within his decision window.
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Table 5 shows the computation of the generalized costs associated with the two
different paths. Finally, airline 1's option has the lower generalized cost, which
means that this passenger will prefer to reschedule his trip and fly his preferred
airline. Given his willingness-to-pay, Mr. X can afford both fares which are lower than
$150. However, this traveler is not assured to book on airline 1 as his booking
request is still subject to availability. Indeed, he must first meet the advance
purchase requirement applying to this ticket, if any, and then request the booking to
airline 1 that has booking limits for each fare-path combination as calculated by its
RM system. If his booking request is rejected, the passenger will request another
booking among the remaining options with the lowest generalized cost, if any.
Eventually, Mr. X will either buy the available ticket with the lowest generalized cost,
or will not book.
Option I
Mean Disutility
Value
(Leisure Traffic)
Mr. X's
Disutility
Cost
Fare
Replanning $30 $40Disutility
Airline
Preference ($20) ($30)
Utility24
Connection $20 $46(PQI=2)
Saturday
Night Stay $90 $67
Requirement
Non-$3$4
Refundability $30 $42
Change fee $30 $28
Total
Option 2
Mean Disutility Mr. X's
Value Disutility
(Leisure Traffic) Cost
$30 $40
($20) ($30)
$20 $46
$90 $67
$30 $42
$30 $28
Table 5: Generalized Cost Computation
Passenger Travel Choice Example
24 Parentheses indicate negative numbers
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3.3. Networks, Fare Structures and Revenue Management
Systems
a. Networks
The PODS network used in this study consists of the following:
> 1 hub
> 2 sets of Spoke cities (East and West Coast)
> O-D markets with mean base fare demands
> 1 set of legs operated by the legacy carrier via its hub
> 1 set of legs operated by the LCC
Two networks were developed in order to highlight the effects of the LCC entry both
at the leg and network levels. These networks were then modified to account for
changes in the number of markets entered by the LCC.
Along with the set of legs operated within the air transportation system, O-D demand
levels for air travel are key parameters determining the properties of a network. In
the PODS environment, demand is divided into 2 categories, i.e. business and leisure
demand. These values are defined for each O-D market served and correspond to
the mean daily demands at base fare.
Network 1: Symmetric Network
The first network is the simplest and is relevant to theoretical analysis only. Indeed,
it is a fully symmetric case, i.e. demands for O-D markets between spoke cities are
all equal. However, demand between hub and spoke cities are much higher as
presented in Table 6.
Business Leisure
Base Fare Base Fare Total
Demand Demand
Between Spoke 4.66 8.66 13.32Cities
Between Spoke 25 50 75City and Hub
Base Fare $325 $130
Table 6: Air Travel Potential Demands in the 2 Types of O-D Markets
(Symmetric Network of Chapter 3 only)
Daily Number of Passengers at Base Fare
These demands were not arbitrarily determined. They were extracted from the
network D6 developed by the PODS airlines consortium, which is based on recent
traffic statistics reported by US legacy carriers. Absolute numbers do not reflect
actual demand between major cities in the US, but the ratios of business vs. leisure
demand and local vs. connecting demand are realistic and consistent with the
capacity of legacy airplanes, i.e. 100 seats.
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In PODS, a day of operations is modeled by one eastbound flow of aircraft. Figures 8
and 9 show the spoke cities served by the legacy carrier as well as the flows of
legacy and LCC aircraft across the network. While the LCC network will change as
O-D markets are added to its operations, the characteristics of the symmetric legacy
network are constant and given below:
> 1 legacy carrier
> 1 hub (H1 located in the North)
> 20 spoke cities
> 60 legs in 3 banks
> 120 O-D markets
All spoke-to-spoke legacy flights are connecting in H1. The legacy carrier operates
the 20 routes between spoke cities and H1 three times per day, i.e. 60 legs in total.
The legacy network is composed of three banks that correspond to coordinated
eastbound flows of aircraft serving all 120 O-D markets with 20 legs.
IM
Figure 8: Legacy Network
Symmetric Network
The LCC adopts a different strategy and operates non-stop flights between spoke
cities. In the thesis, we will assume that the LCC concentrates its operations in pre-
determined spoke cities on the east coast. The LCC will focus on expanding non-stop
service from a limited number of cities, called "hublets". For instance, the cities
number 1 and 5 are LCC hublets in Figure 9. In the spoke-to-spoke markets served
by the LCC, the low-cost airline will operate one to three flights per day. In Chapters
4 and 5, we will analyze the impact of the expansion of LCC operations whose
strategy follows the guidelines stated in this paragraph.
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Figure 9: Example of LCC Network
Network 2: Asymmetric Network (Network D6)
The second network used in the thesis is the framework of a more realistic case as it
accounts for differences in demand between O-D markets. This network is the
network D6 developed by the PODS consortium with the help of the airline partners
who provided real data and participated in the design of this network originally
including two hubs operated by two legacy carriers. The characteristics of the
asymmetric legacy network are given below (see Figure 10):
> 2 legacy carriers
> 2 hubs (H1 located in the North, H2 in the South)
> 40 spoke cities
> 482 O-D markets
> 42 sectors in 3 banks by legacy carrier
The definition of a sector is a route that can be operated multiple times per day. In
this case, legacy aircraft carry passengers in 42 sectors 3 times a day, which implies
that each legacy network is composed of 126 daily flights.
LCC flights will be successively added to the original legacy carrier network to model
the LCC entrance in non-stop markets between spoke cities in the asymmetric case,
similarly to the first symmetric network.
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Figure 10: Legacy Network
Asymmetric Network (Network D6)
Finally, the characteristics of the aircraft operated by the two types of carriers are
different. On one hand, the legacy carrier operates 100-seat aircraft between the
spoke cities and the hub whose significant demand makes the use of wide-body jets
sustainable. On the other hand, the LCC focusing on smaller demand point-to-point
O-D markets operates 30-seat aircraft.
b. Fare Structures
Fare structures rely on two components in the PODS environment, which are
respectively the set of restrictions associated with each type of fare, and the set of
prices applied to each fare product. In terms of restrictions, the networks presented
in this thesis will be uniform. The fare structure in both symmetric and asymmetric
networks is classified as semi-restricted and the following set of restrictions applies
to the 6 fare classes implemented in each O-D market as shown in Table 7:
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a-Z
Advance Stra
Class Purchase Saturday Non- Changerequirement Night Refundability Fee
(in days) Stay
1 0 0 0 0
2 3 0 1 0
3 7 0 1 1
4 10 0 1 1
5 14 0 1 1
6 21 0 1 1
Table 7: Fare Restrictions Applied to 6 Fare Class Structure
In the PODS environment, fare structure is similar across the entire network.
However, ticket prices may differ between O-D markets and the researcher is free to
implement any set of fares to any O-D market. In the first symmetric network, two
sets of fares are implemented as shown in Tables 8 and 9. These sets of fares were
implemented respectively in "Spoke-to-Spoke" and "Spoke-to-Hub" markets.
Class 1 2 -3 4 5 6
Fare 408 297 192 168 144 120
Table 8: Set of Air Fares of Symmetric Network
"Spoke- to-Spoke" Markets
Class 1 2 3 4 5 6
Fare 13291 231 136 1115 194 F72
Table 9: Set of Air Fares of Symmetric Network
"Spoke-to-Hub" Markets
In the second asymmetric network, fares vary to a great extent. For a given route,
fares are primarily based on the route distance. Then, randomness is introduced by
the use of a gravitational model to build a realistic network with asymmetries
between O-D markets. In terms of fares, a network can then be characterized by its
average fare ratio. In a given O-D market, the fare ratio is defined as the ratio of the
highest fare over the lowest fare. For instance, the fare ratio of the fare structure
presented in Figure 8 is equal to $408 divided by $120 which is 3.4. In the second
asymmetric network, the average fare ratio is equal to 4.1 across the network.
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c. Revenue Management Systems
In PODS, the Revenue Management system simulates that of an airline. The
objective is to maximize revenue by setting booking limits by path and fare class.
The limits are updated at each timeframe, i.e. 16 times during the 63 day-booking
process, and are based upon two RM components, the booking forecasts and the
optimization algorithm. Booking forecasts are output by the Forecaster specific to the
airline and fed into the Seat Inventory Control System in which the optimization
algorithm is embedded. Based on current and expected bookings provided by the
Forecaster, booking limits are computed by the algorithm.
Because revenue management systems are not the primary focus of the thesis,
Section c is a short overview of forecasting methods and optimization algorithms
available in PODS. For a complete description of all PODS functions related to
revenue management methods, the reader should refer to Gorin 17 and Cleaz 25.
1) Forecasting and Detruncation
One major assumption of the traditional revenue management systems tested in the
thesis is the independence of demand by fare class. As a result, the Forecaster
determines booking forecasts by:
. Itinerary i
e Timeframe TF,
" Fare classj
The Forecaster use historical bookings to predict future bookings. However, the fare
class j in question may have been closed before departure. In this case, the
Forecaster will perform detruncation to estimate the number of passengers that
would have booked this flight on fare class j if it had remained opened until
departure.
The detruncation method used is called Booking Curve Detruncation. This method
extrapolates the curve of total bookings in class j as a function of timeframe, and
then estimates the unconstrained demand by picking the value of this extrapolated
function at flight departure.
Once the unconstrained demand is obtained, the Forecaster uses the Pick-Up Moving
Average (PUMA) method to estimate the number of "Bookings-To-Come" for classj
from TF. This method takes the average over the previous samples of occurrence of
additional bookings between TFand the departure date.
25 Cleaz, Airline Revenue Management Methods for Less Restricted Fare Structures,
2005, MIT Thesis
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2) Optimization Algorithm
Given the booking forecasts, the Seat Inventory Control System will compute
booking limits using an optimization algorithm. The family of revenue management
algorithms is very large and we present only the method tested in the thesis.
EMSR
The "Expected Marginal Seat Revenue" method was first introduced by Belobaba 26
and then used by a large number of airlines for revenue management purposes. This
method requires the implementation of nested booking limits, i.e. the booking limits
apply to a group of contiguous fare classes including the lowest fare class. As a
result, no booking limit apart from total capacity applies to the highest fare class,
and no booking limit protecting a given class will ever prevent a passenger from
booking in a higher fare class.
The principle is based on the expected revenue of a seat in a given class, equal to
the associated fare multiplied by the probability of selling this seat. As long as this
expected revenue in classj is greater than the expected revenue of the first seat
sold in the next lower classj- 1, the algorithm will protect this seat from classj-7 and
all other classes lower thanj.
26 Belobaba, Air Travel Demand and Airline Seat Inventory Control, 1987, MIT Thesis
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3.4. Calibration of Critical Parameters
The first three sections of this chapter described the underlying structure of PODS,
which relies on a passenger decision model and a seat inventory control system. The
former is inherent to microeconomic characteristics of travelers within the air
transportation network studied, while the latter is specific to an airline as it depends
on the revenue management method implemented within its booking reservation
system. This section presents the methodology developed to define the base case of
the new LCC entry analysis.
The calibration addresses the most important criteria with regard to passenger
choice between a non-stop and a connecting flight, and network characteristics that
will affect the outcomes of the entry. The following parameters were calibrated:
> Disutility costs associated with connections
> Disutility costs associated with replanning
> Elapsed time of LCC flight
> Disutility costs associated with airline preference
> LCC schedule
All parameters will be described and intuitively justified in the relevant section. As for
the second parameter that is not self-explanatory, it results from the implementation
of the Decision Window Model21 in PODS. Before entering the booking process, each
passenger is pre-assigned a decision window that corresponds to his tolerance
relative to departure and arrival time. If a path is outside this window, the passenger
will consider the path as a relevant travel option but replanning disutility costs will be
added to the generalized cost of this path.
Several categories of parameters can be defined according to the type of calibration
they require. Disutilities associated with connections and replanning are inputs for
which estimates can be found in the literature. Yet, their implementation might be
challenging given the specificities of the passenger choice models embedded in
PODS. Therefore, we will use the literature review performed in Chapter 2 to check
the consistency and the order of magnitude of these parameters.
The elapsed time of LCC flights can be inferred from the characteristics of the routes
operated in the network. The elapsed time of a flight is the absolute amount of time
between departure and arrival, i.e. time zones are not taken into account. We will
estimate the reduction in elapsed time achieved by a non-stop flight over a
connecting flight on spoke-to-spoke routes. We will assume that this potential time
advantage remains constant across the O-D markets between spoke cities. This
assumption simplifies reality as each O-D market has specific geographic
characteristics, but still confers a significant competitive advantage to the LCC
competitor.
Finally, airline preference disutility and LCC schedule are parameters that require
calibration as they are very reliant on the business case chosen for the purpose of
the analysis. A preliminary literature review will provide benchmarks in terms of
market shares to expect when 2 competitors provide flights with different levels of
service (i.e. connecting vs. non-stop) in the same market. Airline preference
44
disutility will then be adjusted to reach these goals expressed in market shares. The
LCC schedule will eventually be optimized so as to maximize LCC revenues.
a. Expected Market Shares
In introduction, it was shown that the calibration process will ultimately require a
model that will determine the market shares of competitors offering different types
of service in the same O-D market. Clarke and Melconian2 7 developed a model
that takes into account the heterogeneity of service offered in a given market as well
as the preference of travelers for airlines with high frequency shares. The model was
then calibrated by performing regression analyses on US airline markets served by
non-stop and connecting flights.
The model is motivated by the most common market share model that gives markets
shares as a function of frequency shares
Freq"aMS1 = 'FreFreq
where MS, is the market share of airline i; Freq is the number of non-stop flights
of carrier i in the market; and a is a coefficient accounting for the non-linear
impacts of frequency shares on market shares
This initial model was extended to account for connecting and one-stop flights. A
one-stop flight is a flight that makes one stop at an airport and then departs to its
final destination. While a passenger on a one-stop flight does not have to change
aircraft between departure and arrival, a traveler on a connecting flight must
transfer to another aircraft at the hub. Hence, these lower quality flights were
counted as a fraction of a non-stop flight according to the following formula:
Freq, = Freq,,_s,,p + a -Freq,,,,P ,+ b - Freq.nnctjng
Historically, the formula has been used with coefficients a=0.4 and b=0.1. In order
to check the relevance of these values, Clarke and Melconian performed two
regression analyses on a set of selected markets. The main selection criterion was
the removal or the gain of non-stop service between 1995 and 1999. Eventually,
they obtained two models via a linear and a non-linear regression. The linear
regression implies to assume that a is assumed equal to 1. The results are
presented in Tables 10 and 11.
27 Melconian, Clarke, Effects of Increased Nonstop Routing on Airline Cost and Profit,
2001
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Table 10: Connecting Flight Value Linear Fit Results
Value
a (one-stop) 0.1748
b (connection) 0.0129
a 1.107
Table 11: Connecting Flight Value Non-Linear Fit Results
The LCC entry into an O-D market originally served by a legacy carrier only is
particularly adapted to these models. The condition of heterogeneity in service
offered is indeed respected. Assuming legacy flights are one-stop flights, our base
case consists of one O-D market originally served by 3 one-stop flights that gained
one non-stop flight operated by the LCC. The following results are obtained from the
two models previously presented in Table 12:
Legacy Carrier LCC
Linear Model 34.4% 65.6%
Non-linear Model 40.3% 59.7%
Table 12: Expected Market Shares in LCC Entry Base Case
b. Calibration Environment
The symmetric network is the framework used for calibration purposes. The initial
case consists of the original legacy network where the LCC enters only the S01-S021
O-D market with one flight a day (see fig.11). The initial LCC schedule was
determined based on results provided by the Decision Window Model and is shown in
Table 13. LCC market coverage was maximum when the LCC flight was departing at
the same time as the second daily legacy flight. Ultimately, the schedule will be
optimized so as to maximize LCC revenues with the complete set of parameters
previously calibrated.
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Operator Bank Departure ArrivalNumber Time time
1 7:07 14:05
Legacy Carrier 2 10:36 17:35
3 14:06 21:05
LCC 1 10:36 16:20
Table 13: Legacy and LCC Schedules (Central Time)
...................................................................
Figure 11: LCC Network in Calibration Environment
Because any asymmetry in Revenue Management systems could introduce bias in
the calibration process, both legacy carrier and LCC are assumed to use the same
standard optimization algorithm EMSRb coupled with time series forecasting (see
Section 3.3). Over the last decade, these forecasts and algorithm have become
standard across the airline industry worldwide. Nevertheless, the assumption of
symmetry will be challenged in chapter 5.
Replanning disutility costs are set to their initially calibrated value, i.e. to $73.50 for
business travelers and $14.9 for leisure passengers on average.
Airline preference utility costs are set to $21 (business) and $7 (leisure) in favor of
the legacy carrier. These values are based on results provided by Proussaloglou and
Koppelman".
As a first conservative approximation, the elapsed time of the LCC flight is 1 hour
and 15 minutes shorter than legacy flights on the same route. This value will be
modified to be consistent with previous analyses of flight duration (see Section
2.3.e) and analyze the sensitivity of the results to this time advantage.
In the PODS environment, demand can be calibrated with a demand multiplier. In
chapter 4, we will see the large impact of the total air travel demand on the outcome
of LCC entrance. Therefore, the choice of the average load factor reported at the
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network level is important and must be consistent with the calibration methods used.
In his Master's thesis, Strina2 8 analyzed the recent evolution of airline operational
and econometric measures. He showed that the load factors reported by both the US
Majors and the whole US airline industry were equal to 76%. Since our calibration
process relies on the market share model which was updated based on airline
statistics from the late 90'S21, the PODS demand multiplier was modified to achieve a
70% load factor at the network level, i.e. for the legacy carrier. Moreover, this
relatively low network load factor removes from the analysis all bias that is related to
capacity constraints. Thus, the attractiveness of the LCC will not be boosted by the
limit in capacity offered by the legacy carrier, which defines a better calibration
basis.
Finally, we mention that load factors and revenues of the LCC are unreasonably low
in the calibration process. Indeed, the calibration process is performed disregarding
the demand stimulation due to the large fare decrease that will eventually be
introduced by the LCC in Chapters 4 and 5.
c. Disutility costs associated with one connection
As stated in the section presenting the PODS simulator, the disutility costs associated
with connection and replanning were calibrated by Lee2 1 . As the environment of the
US airline industry has significantly been modified since then, a review of the
disutility costs associated with connections will be performed to check the
consistency of this parameter with the most up-to-date estimates found in the
literature.
As presented in Chapter 2, Adler, Falzarano and Spitz 15 provide estimates of a wide
range of disutility costs including the effects of number of connections. These
estimates are summarized in Table 14. Thus, the next step will be to test these
values and assess the accuracy of these coefficients in the PODS environment.
Mean ($) Standard Deviation
# of connections 69.7 39.2
(business trip)
# of connections 48.5
(leisure traveler)
Table 14: Disutility Costs Distributions for Number of Connections
28 Strina, US Airline Industry Trends and Performance 1999-2204: Analysis of Form
41 Data, 2006 (MIT thesis)
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Calibration
Table 15 presents the connection disutility configurations tested. These cases were
defined so as to fulfill two requirements:
> Business and non-business disutility costs are greater than the intercept value
(See PODS Presentation section)
> Ratio of business over non-business disutility costs is constant and equal to
the ratio computed with values found in the literature
Case I Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 Case 7 Case 8
ness
ns $64.30 $57.70 $54.50 $48.00 $44.80 $41.50 $38.30 $38.30
.ure $22.00 $20.30 $18.60 $17.60 $16.30 $15.00 $12.40 $9.80
Table 15: Connection Disutility Costs by Passenger Type by Test Case
As stated in the first section of this chapter, the objective is to obtain a reasonable
distribution of market shares as a function of the service offered by the airline, i.e.
connecting vs. non-stop service, as well as a base case that corresponds to the
present characteristics of the airline industry. In the case tests, global demand for air
travel was first calibrated so that the average load factor over the original network
was 70%. Then, the LCC flight was introduced and the effects of the entry were
estimated in terms of market shares and number of carried passengers in the 501-
S021 market.
100.00/
90.00/0
00800% 79.0%
70.0%/ - 68 .1% 62 /"
60.0%/6--
50.0/- N Legacy Carnier
38 *LCC
40.0%/o- 31. . E C
30.0%/- 7 20. 21. -227
20.0% -1'
10.00/
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 Case 7 Case 8
Test Case
Figure 12: Market Shares by Competitor in SO1-S21 Market
(Connection Disutility Costs)
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Figure 13: Daily Number of Passengers by Competitor in SO1-S21 Market
As shown in Figures 12 and 13, the traffic performance of the legacy carrier is
strongly affected by the disutility costs associated with connections. As one would
expect, the percentage of passengers booking a ticket on a legacy flight decreases as
connection disutility costs increase. In case 1, only 17% of the total number of 501-
S21 passengers is carried via its hub while this share increases to 38% in case 8.
The disutility cost estimates of Adler, Falzarano and Spitz were based on fares
observed in the US airline industry between 2000 and 2003. Since 2000, fares have
decreased by 18 % on average. Moreover, Geslin (2005) showed that fares decreased
by more than 30% in markets entered by LCCs between 2000 and 2004. Case 5
which corresponds to a 20% decrease as compared to disutility cost estimates of the
literature seems to be the most appropriate value.
d. Effects of Replanning Disutility Costs
In the PODS environment, a decision window is assigned to each passenger entering
the booking process. The decision window is the period of the day preferred by the
traveler willing to depart and arrive within this window. In the PODS booking
process, a path that does not fit into the passenger decision window is still
considered as a relevant travel option but a replanning disutility cost is added to the
total generalized cost of the associated ticket.
Unfortunately, the literature does not provide any estimate of the replanning
disutility costs as most models presented in scientific articles assume the existence
of an ideal departure time. A disutility associated with schedule time difference
accounts for the costs of departing earlier or later than the ideal departure time. This
disutility cost is estimated by hour of displacement. For instance, the results of the
Adler, Falzarano and Spitz analysis with regard to schedule time difference disutility
are presented in Tables 3 and 4. Their estimates for the mean disutility costs
associated with schedule time difference are about $30 and $5. In Chapter 2, we
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present the results of Proussaloglou and Koppelman who conducted a customer
survey and determined that one hour of displacement cost $60 for a business and
$17 for a leisure passenger.
As PODS is based on a different travel time decision model, these previous
references could not be directly implemented in the base case input. Even though
the initial replanning disutility costs had been calibrated by the PODS consortium
originally (see Lee 21 ), the objective of the calibration was to check the relevance of
these initial values.
The ratio of business over leisure replanning disutility was the first point of
investigation. While the Proussaloglou and Koppelman ratio was 3.5, the Adler,
Falzarano and Spitz ratio was 6. The data used by these two groups of researchers
were not contemporary, which may explain the gap in the values they determined.
With an initial ratio of 5, the initial PODS settings seemed to be a reasonable and
conservative choice. Then, an analysis was performed in order to determine the
sensitivity of market shares to replanning disutility. The base case was similar to the
first one used to calibrate disutility costs associated with a connection. However, the
disutility costs associated with one connection were set to $44.80 and $16.30
respectively for business and leisure traffic as a result of the first calibration step.
The cases tested are presented in Table 16.
Table 16: Replanning Disutility Costs by Passenger Type by Test Case
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Figure 14: Comparison of Market Shares by Competitor in SO1-S21 Market
(Replanning Disutility Costs)
The range of values tested was selected to be consistent with the estimates of
schedule time difference disutility found in the literature. Indeed, both ideal
departure time and DWM models are correlated and a relation between the
disutilities of these models must exist. If we estimated the average schedule
displacement time of a passenger considering travel alternatives outside his
preferred decision window in the DWM environment, the schedule time difference
multiplied by this displacement should give the DWM replanning disutility cost.
Hence, the test cases are equivalent to an average schedule displacement between
1.8 and 2.8 hours for business passengers, and between 2.3 and 3.6 for leisure
travelers29. In the base case, the legacy carrier operates flights departing at regular
intervals of 3 hours and the elapsed time between the first and the last daily flight is
6 hours. The range of values tested is therefore appropriate to the case analyzed.
As compared to connection disutility, the sensitivity of the results to replanning
disutility costs is smaller. Based on Figure 14, market shares change to a greater
extent when leisure connection disutility is increased by $1 than leisure replanning
disutility.
The initial replanning disutility cost setting, i.e. case 4, was selected for two reasons.
First, the equivalent schedule displacement equal to 2.5 hours for business
passengers and 3 hours for leisure passengers seemed reasonable based on the
legacy carrier schedule and the time position of the LCC flight, which departs at the
same time as the second daily legacy flight. Then, the relatively low sensitivity of
results to replanning costs dissipated the need for a very precise replanning disutility
cost estimate that could have significant negative impacts on the final results.
29 In this case, schedule time difference disutility referred to the Adler, Falzarano and
Spitz analysis
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e. Effects of Reduction in LCC Flight Duration
Initially, the flight duration of the LCC flight was set equal to the sum of the two
flight durations of the legs S01-H1 and H1-S21, minus 15 minutes. This
overestimated value must be adjusted to reflect the real operating advantage of non-
stop flights over connecting flights.
Three factors play a key role in the reduction of flight duration. First and foremost,
non-stop flights do not experience connecting time at hub. Second, the aircraft on a
non-stop route performs one take-off and one landing while a connecting airplane
performs two of each of these operations. Because speed is reduced in the initial
climb after take-off and the final descent, the non-stop aircraft requires less time to
travel the same distance. Finally, the routing of the aircraft can be optimized and
flight distance can be reduced as the hub cannot lie on the shortest path joining the
spoke cities of its network. The second factor will result in a significant decrease in
flight duration as well.
The calibration tests were performed with the following set of parameters:
> Optimized connection disutility costs set to $44.80 (business), $16.30
(leisure)
> Optimized replanning disutility costs set to $73.50 (business), $14.90
(leisure)
> Airline preference utility costs set to $21 (business) and $7 (leisure) in favor
of the legacy carrier
> Initial LCC schedule
Operator Bank Departure ArrivalNumber Time time
1 7:07 14:05
Legacy Carrier 2 10:36 17:35
3 14:06 21:05
LCC 1 10:36 15:50
Table 17: Legacy and LCC Schedule
(LCC Flight Duration 5h15)
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Figure 15: Comparison of Market Shares by Competitor in SO 1-S21 Market
Results presented in Figure 15 show that market shares are not very sensitive to
flight duration. However, this factor might be crucial for further steps of the
calibration process, including the optimization of the LCC schedule.
Based on the schedule of the legacy carrier, the determination of the time gain due
to connecting time at the hub is simple. In the base case, this gain is equal to 1
hour. Estimates related to take-off and landing durations can be found in the
literature. In his PhD thesis, Schorr30 performed a regression analysis using
published schedule data in order to relate scheduled block time with aircraft speed
and flight distance. Letting d be the flight distance and v the cruise speed, the
following formula was established:
d
BlockHours(d,v)= 0.5944 + 1.0562--
V
The intercept can be interpreted as the BlockHour time due to the performance of
take-off and landing operations. Thus, 0.5944 hour or roughly 35 minutes is then a
satisfactory approximation of what one could expect from the reduction in LCC flight
duration due to one less take-off and one less landing. In the third and fourth
chapter of this thesis, most of the markets entered by the LCC are aligned with the
legacy hub H1. Therefore, a reduction of 1 hour and 45 minutes in LCC flight
duration appeared to be conservative but reasonable given the structure of the air
networks used.
3 Schorr, Aviation Infrastructure Pricing, 2006 (MIT Thesis)
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f. Effects of Airline Preference Disutility Costs
The airline preference disutility regroups a string of factors that will affect the
traveler decision process but do not refer to the previously calibrated parameters
such as flight times, flight duration, connections and price. Given the recent large
reductions in costs of the US airline industry following 9/11, onboard service offered
by legacy carriers in coach class cannot be viewed as a persuasive sales argument.
However, legacy airlines continue to make big investments in their loyalty programs,
and increase the distribution channels via websites like Orbitz in order to attract
customers to their systems. Indeed, these marketing strategies have met with a
significant success over the last decade.
All travelers are not familiar with the plethora of websites offering air tickets. As
customers tend to focus their web search on a limited number of websites, legacy
carriers sell tickets on the best known ones, which must stimulate demand for legacy
flights. Moreover, Frequent Flyer programs have been very successful in enhancing
customer loyalty. This commercial success led to the expansion of air alliances
enabling travelers to accumulate miles and increase loyalty further.
On one hand, Adler, Falzarano and Spitz estimated utility costs related to the size of
the carrier in the market considered. Their results are presented in Tables 3 and 4
and show that these costs are very significant. On the other hand, Proussaloglou and
Koppelman looked at the problem from a different perspective and considered the
effects of loyalty programs only. The results are consistent with the more recent
analysis of Adler as the ratio between business and leisure disutility costs is close to
3. Therefore, we decided to perform the sensitivity analysis with regard to airline
preference disutility by choosing a constant ratio of 3 between business and leisure
disutility, and determine the value for which the market shares of the legacy carrier
will be consistent with the results given by the formula developed by Clarke and
Melconian. The cases tested are presented in Table 18.
Case I Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 Ca,
less $21.00 $25.00 $30.00 $35.00 $40.00 $45.00 $5C
ip
ure $7.00 $8.30 $10.00 $11.70 $13.30 $15.00 $1E
Table 18: Airline Preference Disutility Costs by Passenger Type by Test Case
The calibration tests were performed with the following set of parameters:
> Optimized connection disutility costs set to $44.8 (business), $16.3 (leisure)
> Optimized replanning disutility costs set to $73.5 (business), $14.9 (leisure)
> Initial LCC departure time
> 1h45 reduction in LCC flight duration
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Figure 16: Comparison of Market Shares by Competitor in SO1-S21 Market (Airline
Preference Disutility Costs)
As shown in Figure 16, the sensitivity of results to airline preference disutility is
greater than for other input parameters calibrated previously. In fact, airline
preference disutility is the last most important parameter slightly adjusted in order
to be consistent with the objective in market shares set by the Clarke and Melconian
analysis. LCC market shares are expected to be between 34.4% and 40.3%. Based
on Figure 11, an airline preference disutility of $35 for business travelers seems to
be the most appropriate setting (case 4).
The magnitude of this disutility cost can be intuitively justified. Assuming that
frequent flyer programs are the biggest incentives for business travelers to choose
their preferred airline, and that these programs usually require the purchase of five
tickets to get one for free, the disutility value means that business passengers are
willing to pay 44% of the "free" ticket since a one-way Y business fare costs about
$400 (see 2.2.b).
g. LCC Schedule
The final step of the calibration consists of determining the LCC schedule defined as
revenue-maximizing for the LCC. The initial settings were determined by maximizing
the market coverage of the LCC flight with the Decision Window Model given the
legacy schedule. The subsequent simulation results show that the initial schedule,
i.e. with the LCC flight departing at the same time as the second daily legacy flight,
was indeed maximizing LCC revenues in the PODS environment.
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The calibration tests were performed with the following set of parameters:
> Optimized connection disutility costs set to $44.80 (business), $16.30
(leisure)
> Optimized replanning disutility costs set to $73.50 (business), $14.90
(leisure)
> Optimized airline preference utility costs set to $35 (business) and
$11.70 (leisure)
> 1h45 reduction in LCC flight duration
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Figure 17: Comparison of Market Shares by Competitor in SO1-S21 Market (LCC
schedule)
Figure 17 shows that a LCC flight departing at the same time as the second daily
legacy flight maximizes LCC revenues peaking at $1267 per day. In the rest of the
thesis, the LCC flight will therefore depart at the same time than the second daily
legacy flight when only one LCC flight is operated in the O-D market. Table 19 gives
an example of appropriate legacy and LCC schedules.
Operator Bank Departure ArrivalNumber Time time
1 7:07 14:05
Legacy Carrier 2 10:36 17:35
__ 
3 14:06 21:05
LCC 1 10:36 15:50
Table 19: Legacy and LCC Schedules with 1 LCC Flight per Day
Example in SO1-S21 Market
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h. Summary
The findings of Chapter 3 are summarized in Table 20. All required parameters were
calibrated to build a realistic model of passenger behavior with consistent disutility
costs, and achieve the objective in terms of market shares set by the Clarke and
Melconian analysis.
In PODS, connection disutility costs can refer to two factors involved in the
connecting process. The first is the disutility associated with the inconvenience
related to the connection, i.e. a passenger must move from an aircraft to another,
turn off his laptop and carry his bags across the terminal. The second is the risk of
losing his luggage and missing the connecting flight. The magnitude of the calibrated
connection disutility values, which have means of $44.80 and $16.30 respectively for
business and leisure passengers, is reasonable given the potential risks and
inconvenience enhanced by congestion in the US air network and the numerous
alternatives offered by expanding non-stop service.
In Chapters 4 and 5, the initial values of replanning disutility costs calibrated by Lee
will remain unchanged. The consistency of these values can be checked by order of
magnitude calculations as well. Assume a business traveler whose salary is $75 000,
this passenger works 50 weeks a year and about 40 hours a week. Therefore, an
hour of his working time is worth about $37.50. Setting replanning disutility costs to
$73.50 for business passengers is equivalent to fixing a penalty of 2 hours of work to
a flight that is located outside the passenger decision window. Given the legacy
schedule with flights spaced every 3.5 hours, the magnitude of replanning disutility
costs is correct.
In Section 3.3.e, we showed that airline preference disutility costs solely due to
frequent flier programs means that business passengers are willing to pay 44% of
the "free" ticket offered after 5 purchases, which is realistic of the current marketing
attractiveness of these programs.
Finally, LCC flight time and schedule were determined by following scientific
methodologies that do not cast any doubt on the consistency of these results.
Business Leisure
Passengers Passengers
Connection Disutility $44.80 $16.30Costs
Replanning Disutility $73.50 $14.90Costs
Airline Preference $35.00 $11.70Disutility Costs
Reduction in LCC 1:45 1:45Flight Time
LCC Departure Time 10:36 10:36
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Table 20: Summary Table of Calibrated Parameters
4. Impacts of LCC Entry in a Symmetric Legacy
Network
In Chapter 3, we developed and used a methodology to calibrate the Passenger
Decision Model embedded in PODS so that it will simulate passengers' choices
between LCC non-stop flights and legacy connecting flights realistically. Chapter 4
presents the results associated with LCC entry in the symmetric legacy network
described in Section 3.3.a. The analysis will focus on the amount of traffic captured
by the LCC, the average fare in the markets entered by the LCC, and the aggregate
statistics of both carriers including revenue and load factor.
First, we will define a base case of LCC entry. Indeed, the introduction of LCC
operations must be combined with a significant decrease in fares stimulating
demand. We will perform sensitivity analysis by gradually decreasing fares in one
market entered by the LCC, check the consistency of PODS demand stimulation with
real LCC entry cases, and select the most appropriate fare decrease. In fact, each 0-
D market of a real airline network has its own specificities as demand elasticity
varies between markets and changes across time as well. In this thesis, we will focus
on LCC entry cases with high demand stimulation.
Then, we will analyze the impact of a LCC entering multiple legacy markets with one
non-stop flight per day. The LCC strategy will be described and we will examine the
statistics at several levels, including the market and the network level. Finally, we
will increase the frequency of LCC operations in the markets entered by the low-cost
airline and determine to which extent the results differ from the entry scenario with
single LCC frequency.
4.1. Calibration of Base Case
a. Demand Stimulation Analysis
In Chapter 3, we defined a symmetric network with specific demand levels so that
the legacy network load factor would be approximately 70%. The objective was to
remove bias related to capacity constraints from the calibration process. However,
such a load factor is unrealistic (see Strina 28 ) and underestimates the current load
factor within the US. Indeed, the average load factor for the entire US air network is
77.5O%31 . As the increase in the average load factor of the US airline industry is also
likely to continue in the foreseeable future, we modified the demand levels of the
symmetric network to achieve an 87% load factor on the network level. Table 21
presents the base fare demands between spoke cities and between spoke city and
hub, as well as the associated base fares.
31 U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Office of
Airline Information, Airline Industry Traffic Statistics, January 2006
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Although the network load factor chosen may seem high, the order of magnitude is
not only justified by recently reported load factors in some markets of the US airline
industry, but also necessary due to the use of a symmetric network as a base case in
which each spoke-to-spoke market is a potential target for the LCC. The base case
must define a framework where LCC operations are sustainable against legacy
competition in each market, which implies that all markets between spoke cities
must be of significant size.
Mean Business
Base Fare
Demand
Mean Leisure
Base Fare
Demand
Total
Between Spoke 6.52 12.12 18.64Cities
Between Spoke 35.00 70.00 105City and Hub
Base Fare $325.00 $130.00
Table 21: Air Travel Demands at Base Fare
The base case will be calibrated by introducing LCC operations in the S01-S21
market (see map in Section 3.3.a). As in the conclusion of chapter 3, the LCC enters
the SO1-S21 market by operating one flight a day departing at the same time as the
second legacy flight. The associated schedule is presented in Table 19 and shows
that the total LCC flight time is 1h45 shorter than for the legacy connecting flights.
All parameters involved in the passenger decision process are set to the values
previously calibrated in Chapter 3.
The initial fare structure and statistics for the S01-S21 market without LCC operation
are presented in Tables 22 and 23. The fare structure is composed of six booking
classes with a fare ratio of 3.4. As the legacy carrier operates three flights a day
between each spoke city and its hub H1, we define new aggregate load factor
measures, i.e. the load factors associated with the legs S01-Hub and the legs Hub-
S21, to analyze the impact of LCC operations at the S01-S21 market level. The load
factor of the legs S01-Hub is defined as the average of the load factors reported by
the legacy carrier for the 3 daily legs between S01 and H1. Similarly, the load factor
of the legs Hub-S21 is the average of the load factors for the 3 daily legacy legs
between H1 and S21.
Unsurprisingly, the load factors of both
close to the 87% network load factor
network is symmetric. The average fare
greater than the lowest fare. Indeed, the
carrier limits the bookings of potential
classes to improve revenue. As a result,
base fare demand of 18.6 passengers.
legs S01-Hub and legs Hub-S21 are very
reported by the legacy carrier since the
in the market equals $163, which is 34%
revenue management system of the legacy
S01-S21 passengers by closing low fare
the reported traffic is 14% lower than the
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Class 1 2 3 4 5 6
Fare 407.59 297.30 191.81 167.83 143.86 119.88
Table 22: Initial Fare Structure in S01-S21 Market
SO1-S21 Market Average Fare Load Factor Load Factor
Traffic S01 -S21 Market Legs S01-Hub Legs Hub-S21
Legacy Carrier 16.1 $163.10 86.12% 86.28%
LCC / I I I
Total 16.1 $163.10 I I
Table 23: Traffic and Revenue Statistics for the SO1-S21 Market
In a second case, one daily LCC flight is introduced with no change to the initial fare
structure. As the legacy carrier is assumed to match the competition, both carriers
apply the same set of fares to their products presented in Table 24. The associated
statistical results are shown in Table 25. A large proportion of the S01-S21 traffic is
now carried by the LCC whose market share is 71%. This value is higher than the
market share obtained by the LCC after the final calibration step in chapter 3.
Indeed, the network load factor of the legacy carrier is greater, which allows the
legacy revenue management system to continue to close low fare classes of the S01-
S21 flights early in the booking process even in presence of the LCC. As the legs
SO1-Hub and Hub-S21 are used to serve other markets than S01-S21, the loss of
traffic due to the LCC competition in 501-521 can be partially compensated by
travelers booking in other markets. Thus, the legacy carrier can remain aggressive in
closing low fare classes. This hypothesis is corroborated by the increase in the legacy
average fare from $163 to $168 as compared to the previous case with no LCC
operation.
Since the load factor reported by the LCC is only 45%, the new competitor has a
weaker pricing power than the incumbent which benefits from the shared utilization
of its legs serving multiple markets. Indeed, load factors for both the legacy legs
S01-Hub and legs Hub-S21 are still close to 86% even with a reduced 29% market
share in S01-S21. This structural difference causes the LCC average fare to be $19
lower than its competitor's.
The total number of passengers in the S01-S21 market is slightly greater than the
total base fare demand. This result is due to the lowest fare in S01-S21 that is lower
than the base fare (see Section 3.2.d). However, the 45% load factor reported by
the LCC confirms that a low-cost operation is not realistic if not combined with a
significant fare decrease triggering demand stimulation.
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Class 1 2 3 4 5 6
Fare 407.59 297.30 191.81 167.83 143.86 119.88
Table 24: Initial Fare Structure in SO1-S21 Market
Legacy Carrier and LCC
SO1-S21 Market Average Fare Load Factor Load Factor
Traffic SO1-S21 Market Legs S01-Hub Legs Hub-S21
Legacy Carrier 5.6 $168.40 86.15% 85.79%
LCC 13.5 $149.30 44.88% /
Total 19.0 $154.90 / /
Table 25: Traffic and Revenue Statistics for the SO1-S21 Market
The third case corresponds to a 20% decrease in the initial set of fares. The new set
is presented in Table 26 and applied to the products of both carriers. Table 27
includes the associated traffic and fare statistics. As compared to the first case with
no LCC operation, the total market average fare decreases by 24% while total traffic
increases by 82% in the S01-S21 market. These first results show that the PODS
demand model with the current e-mult parameters results in substantial demand
stimulation, which is the objective stated in the introduction of Chapter 4.
As compared to the previous case with higher fares, the reported traffic of both
carriers increases. The LCC load factor is close to 67%, which is more realistic for
sustainable operations than the 45% load factor without price stimulation. However,
the number of 501-S21 passengers carried by the legacy airline does not reach its
initial level when LCC did not compete in the market.
The average fares of both the LCC and the legacy carrier are greatly reduced as
compared to the previous case with no fare decrease. The legacy average fare is
down from $168 to $138, which is equivalent to an 18% decrease. Similarly, the LCC
average fare decreased from $149 to $119, or 31%. The difference between LCC and
legacy average far remains constant at $19, which is significant and related to the
shared use of legacy legs by multiple markets as in the previous case.
In terms of market share, the legacy carrier reports a greater proportion of SO1-S21
bookings than in the previous case. Indeed, the legacy market share is about 32 %.
As the LCC load factor increases, we observe a greater number of simulated days in
which the LCC flight is full. Consequently, the legacy carrier takes advantage of
limited LCC offer on these days with high demand, which leads to a higher market
share in S01-S21.
Class 1 2 3 4 5 6
Fare 326.00 238.00 153.00 134.00 115.00 96.00
Table 26: Initial Fares Decreased by 20% in SO1-S21 Market
Legacy Carrier and LCC
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Legacy Carrier
LCC
Total
I1
S01-S21 Market
Traffic
9.4
19.9
29.3
III
Average Fare
S01 -S21 Market
$138.40
$119.20
$125.40
Load Factor
Legs S01 -Hub
86.37%
66.49%
I
Load Factor
Legs Hub-S21
86.17%
I
I
Table 27: Traffic and Revenue Statistics for the SO1-S21 Market
Finally, Tables 28 and 29 present the results associated with a 40% decrease in
fares. The total number of passengers carried in SO1-S21 is up to 48.2, which
represents a 200% increase as compared to the initial case with no LCC operation.
This increase is great and close to the upper bound of one would expect from a 40%
decrease in fares. In the conclusion of this section, we will see that such an increase
in demand is uncommon but realistic, and has been observed in the US and Europe
when low-cost flights were introduced.
The surge in demand pushes the LCC load factor up to 88%. As a result of this
limited LCC capacity, more S01-S21 passengers turn to the legacy carrier to book a
flight. As compared to the previous case with a 20% fare decrease, the LCC traffic
increases by about 6 passengers only whereas the legacy carrier reports on average
12 more passengers per simulated day. The legacy market share is 4 5 %, which is a
significant shift from the initial 29% legacy market share with the initial fare
structure.
The decrease in fares in the 501-521 market is reflected in the average fares
reported by both the LCC and the legacy carrier. These fares are respectively 40%
and 4 6 % lower than the values in the initial fare structure. In the end, the
introduction of LCC operations combined with a 40% fare decrease results in a
40.4% decrease in average fare on the market level.
Class 1 1 2 3 4 5 6
Fare 245.00 178.00 115.00 101.00 86.00 72.00
Table 28: Initial Fares Decreased by 40% in
Legacy Carrier and LCC
S01-S21 Market
SO1-S21 Market
Traffic-
Average Fare
S01-S21 Market
Load Factor
Legs S01-Hub I Load FactorLegs Hub-S21
Legacy Carrier 21.8 $107.10 87.27% 87.59%
LCC 26.4 $89.10 88.16% I
Total 48.2 $97.20 I /
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Table 29: Traffic and Revenue Statistics for the SO 1-S21 Market
I
II
b. Conclusion
In the PODS environment, demand stimulation is primarily determined by the e-mult
multiplier inputs to the Passenger Decision Model (see Section 3.2.d). As shown in
the previous section, the calibrated parameters lead to a great increase in demand
when LCC flights are introduced and fares are decreased. Indeed, a 23.10/0 decrease
in average fare results in an 82% increase in traffic, and a 40.4% decrease triples
traffic of the S01-S21 market. Table 30 summarizes the results of the demand
stimulation analysis.
No Fare 13.46 $149.28 71%Decrease _________
10% Fare 16.67 $133.44 70%Decrease _________
20% Fare 19.95 $119.21 68%Decrease_________
30% Fare 23.66 $104.46 63%Decrease __________ ___________ _________
%Frese 26.45 $89.05 55%
Table 30: Summary Chart of Low-Cost Entry Case in SO1-S21
The intent of the thesis is to build a framework of analysis for LCC entry cases with
high demand stimulation. The demand stimulation analysis performed in Section a
showed that demand is elastic in the markets of the symmetric network. However,
the definition of a base case requires us to check the consistency of the demand
stimulation magnitude with real entry cases. In her analysis, Perry32 provides
benchmarks for traffic stimulation following the introduction of low-fare airline
service. She selected O-D markets in the US where LCC service was introduced
between 1993 and 1994, and determined the decrease in average fare as well we
the increase in the annual number of passengers. Table 31 includes a summary of
these results, which shows that demand elasticity is very heterogeneous across O-D
markets in the US.
32 Linda J. Perry, The Response of Major
of Airline Economics, 2nd Edition
Airlines to Low-Cost Airlines, The Handbook
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Mean LCC Traffic LCC Average Fare LCC Market Share
Low-fare Airline Annual Origin-Destination Passengers Average One-Way Airline Fare
Market Percent Increase Percent Decrease
Salt Lake City to 281% 45%
San Diego
Phoenix to 121% 30%Burbank
Seattle to 86% 45%Spokane
Atlanta to 75% 44%Orlando
Table 31: Decrease in Average Fare and Demand Surge
In selected US Markets between 1993 and 1994
Based on the benchmarks provided by the Perry analysis, the demand stimulation
observed in PODS with the current settings and 40.4% decrease in average fare is
aggressive but plausible. As we intent to simulate entry cases with high demand
stimulation, we will select the case where the initial set of fares is decreased by 40%
as the base case for further investigation.
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4.2. 1 LCC Hublet with Single Frequency
In the previous section, we determined a base case specifying the decrease in fares
implemented in the markets entered by the LCC. As the legacy carrier is assumed to
match the fares offered by any competitor, the fare decrease will always be applied
to both the legacy carrier and the LCC in the markets where low-fare service is
offered. This major assumption will never be changed in the rest of the thesis, which
will focus on investigating the impact of expanding LCC operations in terms of traffic
and revenue.
The first LCC strategy will consist of entering spoke-to-spoke markets with one flight
a day departing from a single spoke city called "hublet". Figure 18 illustrates this
strategy with a LCC operating 6 non-stop flights from the hublet S01. As for the
order of entrance, S01-S21 will be entered first, SO1-S22 second, etc... The S01-S30
will therefore be the last market entered. At the network level, O-D demands are
based on the values presented in Table 21. As in the previous section, the initial
network load factor of the legacy carrier will be 87%. In all LCC markets, the flight
operated by the low-fare airline will depart at the same time as the second daily
legacy flight. The Passenger Decision Model will remain calibrated to the values
determined in Chapter 3, which includes the 1 hour 45 minute reduction in the travel
time associated with LCC. Finally, a 40% decrease in the initial set of fares will be
implemented in the markets entered by the LCC.
Figure 18: LCC Network with 1 Hublet SO1
In this section, the statistics with regard to traffic and revenue will focus both on the
market and the network level. To analyze statistics at an intermediate level, we
introduce two measures referring to the load factor and the average fare of the
group "legacy legs ex-S01". The load factor of the legs ex-SO1 is defined as the
average of the three legacy legs between 501 and H1. The average fare of the legs
ex-SO1 is defined as the total revenue generated by all markets with origin S01,
including S01-Hi (11 markets in total), divided by the corresponding number of
passengers.
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a. Network Statistics
Following the LCC entry strategy described in the previous section, we gradually
introduced up to ten LCC flights departing from S01 to ten different spoke cities.
Figure 19 shows the revenue of the legacy carrier and the LCC at the network level.
On one hand, the increase in LCC revenue is quasi-linear. As the network is totally
symmetric in terms of demand between spoke cities, this result is unsurprising. On
the other hand, the changes in legacy network revenue are uneven and reflect
network effects due to hub operations. In this configuration, a carrier operating legs
serving multiple markets may use available seats in multiple ways. Further analysis
at the market level will show that revenue and traffic associated with all markets ex-
S01 both decrease when a LCC flight is added to the network. Thus, irregular
changes in legacy network revenue indicate that the revenue management system of
the legacy carrier takes advantage of these extra seats for supplying other markets
than O-D pairs with origin S01.
In the end, low-fare operations affect legacy network revenues negatively although
legacy revenue may sporadically increase or remain stable when another LCC flight is
introduced. After the introduction of 10 LCC flights from S01, the legacy carrier
reports a 1.2% drop in revenue.
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Figure 19: Legacy and LCC Revenues
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In terms of load factor, Figure 20 shows that load factor changes greatly differ
between the legacy carrier and the LCC. While the legacy airline reports a load factor
approximately constant around 87%, the LCC seems to benefit from some extra
demand as it expands its network to all markets served from S01.
950%_ M
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91 .00/0
89.0/o
87.0%
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w Legacy Carrier
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Figure 20: Legacy and LCC Network Load Factors
An intuitive explanation of the LCC increase in load factor may seem challenging as
the legacy network is symmetric in terms of demand between spoke cities. In fact,
this trend is caused by interactions between markets ex-SO1 served by the legacy
carrier. The analysis at the market level reveals that the introduction of one LCC
flight per day combined with a 40% decrease in fares results in a significant increase
in the demand for both carriers. This increase is illustrated by the initial leap in
legacy load factor when the first LCC flight is introduced. As the LCC network
expands, the aggregate legacy demand for the markets served by the three legs
between SO1 and H1 increases. However, seat inventory control is managed by the
revenue management system of the legacy carrier, which achieves an approximately
constant load factor to enhance revenues. When a new market is introduced by the
LCC, the legacy carrier is therefore forced to spill an increasing number of
passengers in the other markets departing from S01 in order to accommodate the
soaring demand in the market newly entered. In the other markets, the passengers
spilled by the legacy carrier confer a competitive advantage to the LCC because they
can book on LCC flights only. As a result, the LCC load factor increases slightly as the
low-fare network grows.
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Figure 21: Legacy Traffic by Market ex-SO1
Figure 21 illustrates the interactions between markets ex-SO1 served by the legacy
carrier when LCC flights are introduced and demand soars in the corresponding
markets. In SO1-S21, the legacy carrier traffic is about 22 passengers after the first
LCC entry in this market. As the LCC network expands, the demand for legacy flights
increases in the new spoke-to-spoke markets operated by the LCC. With a constant
capacity and a revenue management achieving a constant load factor, the legacy
carrier ultimately reports lower bookings in the S01-S21 markets when the LCC
operates ten flights a day from S01. In the end, the legacy airline carries about 18
passengers in S01-S21 when the LCC operates in all spoke-to-spoke markets from
S01. As the demand of the S01-S21 market has not changed since the first LCC
introduction, more passengers book the LCC flight in this market, which affects the
LCC aggregate load factor positively.
b. Statistics at Intermediate Level
As previously stated, we introduce two measures related to the "legacy legs ex-S01".
The load factor of the legs ex-SO1 is defined as the average of the three legacy legs
between 501 and H1. The average fare of the legs ex-SO1 is defined as the total
revenue generated by all markets with origin 501, including S01-H1, divided by the
corresponding number of passengers. These measures will allow us to investigate
more aggregate impacts of expanding LCC operations.
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Based on Figure 22, the analysis of the average fare for the legs ex-SO1 shows that
the legacy carrier reports an intuitive and continuous decrease as LCC flights are
gradually introduced. Once the LCC competes in all spoke-to-spoke markets with
origin 501, this average fare is down from $142 to $122. This 14% change is much
smaller than the 40% fare decrease implemented in these markets, and is partially
due to the protection of the S01-H1 market against the LCC, which competes only on
spoke-to-spoke routes.
Then, the number of ex-S01 passengers decreases slightly as LCC flights are added
to the network. In the previous section, we saw that market demand soars for both
the legacy carrier and the LCC when one LCC flight is proposed in the market and
fares are decreased by 40%. Therefore, the decrease in ex-SO1 passengers can only
be interpreted as a reaction of the legacy revenue management system to the
increase in demand.
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Figure 22: Legacy Average Fare for Legs Ex-SO1
Since both the average fare and the traffic for the legs ex-SO1 decrease, aggregate
revenues for the corresponding markets must be reduced as well. Figure 23 shows to
which extent legacy revenues in the markets with origin 501 are affected by the LCC
entries. Overall, the trend in revenue is continuously downward. If we limit the
analysis to the markets with origin S01, LCC operations finally cost $6,237 to the
legacy carrier. As compared to the $5,805 decrease in average network revenues
experienced by the legacy carrier, the discrepancy in revenue losses confirms the
assumption that hub structures can partially compensate for the lack of revenue
opportunity in certain markets. This conclusion is a result of the shared utilization of
legs by the legacy carrier to serve multiple markets.
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Figure 23: Legacy Revenue and Load Factor for Legs Ex-SO1
Unlike the legacy carrier, the LCC average fare for the entire network remains
approximately constant around $88. Figure 24 illustrates the changes in both
average fare and traffic reported by the LCC. Due to the symmetry of the legacy
network, the LCC traffic increase is regular and the decrease in average fare
insignificant. Slight irregularities are due to the downstream effects produced by the
extra demand rejected by the legacy carrier when LCC flights are introduced, as
explained in the previous section. For instance, when the LCC opens a new route, the
absolute variation in the number of LCC passengers increases as the number of LCC
flights grows.
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Figure 24: LCC Network Average Fare
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c. Statistics at Market Level
On the intermediate level, the aggregate statistics with regard to legacy traffic and
average fare show that these two performance indicators decrease continuously as
the LCC network expands. However, the understanding of the mechanisms involved
can be refined by an analysis at the market level. For a given market with its origin
airport served by the LCC, two phases with very different properties can be
distinguished in terms of changes in traffic and average fare. As expected, for a
route that will eventually be operated by the LCC, the introduction of the LCC flight
in this specific market is a turning point along the overall expansion of LCC
operations.
The analysis of two specific markets will be emphasized:
e the first legacy market entered by the LCC S01-S21
" the last legacy market entered by the LCC S01-S30
* the fifth legacy market entered by the LCC S01-S25
First Legacy Market Entered SO1 -S21
Figure 25 presents the changes in legacy average fare and legacy traffic for the first
market entered by the LCC. The LCC entrance results in a 37% drop in average fare,
plummeting from $171 to $107. Simultaneously, the traffic reported for the S01-521
market soars by 37%. The 40% decrease in the initial set of fares stimulates the
market demand greatly, which results in demand surges for both carriers since the
LCC capacity is limited to one flight a day. Overall, the introduction of the S01-S21
LCC flight causes the legacy carrier to sell more tickets at much lower prices in the
market.
Then, as the number of LCC markets grows, the shift observed at the LCC entry is
reversed. Following the introduction of the first LCC flight in SO1-S21, the number of
legacy passengers in this market is reduced significantly by each increment of LCC
operations. Once all spoke-to-spoke markets with origin S01 are served by the LCC,
the market traffic is down from a peak at 21.7 to 18.4 passengers on average.
As LCC operations expand, a surge in demand similar to the one observed in 501-
S21 occurs in the other markets entered by the LCC. In Section b presenting the
aggregate statistics at the intermediate level, the number of bookings for all markets
with origin S01 is shown to remain approximately constant. As the LCC grows, this
result implies that some passengers in the S01-S21 market will be rejected from the
booking process to accommodate more passengers in other markets entered by the
LCC. For instance, as the LCC enters the S01-S22 market, the demand for this
market soars. Since the RM system caps the total number of passengers from S01,
fewer S01-S21 bookings can be accepted, which is confirmed by Figure 25.
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In the end, three main factors cause the number of S01-S21 passengers to decrease
as the LCC expands:
" the surge in demand following any LCC entry
" the RM system capping the number of passengers departing from S01
" the symmetry of the legacy network
Indeed, the symmetry plays a great in role as the RM system has no reason to
favorite any particular spoke-to-spoke market from SO1, which reduces the supply
for S01-S21 when demand in other markets surges.
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Figure 25: Legacy Statistics for S01-S21 Market
In the previous paragraph, we described the mechanism leading to a decrease in
S01-S21 passengers and found it due to a shortage of supply. As opposed to a case
where demand lowers, we would expect the legacy carrier to take advantage of the
limited supply in SO1-S21 by increasing fares and thus reducing the associated
number of bookings. The assumption is confirmed by Figure 25 showing that the
average fare increases from $107 to $119 when the number of LCC markets
increases from 1 to 10.
Last Legacy Market Entered SO1 -S30
The analysis of the last market entered by the LCC corroborates the results
associated with the first market served by the low-fare airline. As the number of LCC
flights increases, the demand for both carriers on legs departing from S01 soars. As
explained in the previous section, this surge is due to the fare decrease in the
markets entered by the LCC and the limited offer of low-fare service. The legacy RM
system capping the total number of passengers on the legs ex-SO1, the shortage of
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supply also affects the markets not served by the LCC. Indeed, the demand in these
markets has remained constant while passengers in other markets served by the LCC
rush to book legacy flights. As shown by Figure 26, it results in a decreasing number
of S01-S30 passengers as the LCC increases its number of flights from 0 to 9.
Simultaneously, the S01-S30 average fare increases as a response of the RM system
to the shortage of supply in a market with constant demand.
As for SO1-S21, the trend is abruptly reversed as the LCC enters the S01-S30
market. Following the LCC entrance, traffic report jumps from 13.5 to 19.1
passengers on average while the average fare drops by 35%.
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Figure 26: Legacy Statistics for SO 1-S30 Market
Overall, the LCC entrance in the ten spoke-to-spoke markets from S01 leads to a
major decrease in the legacy average fare, dropping from about $170 to $120, and a
rise in traffic from about 17 to 19 passengers in all these markets. Interestingly, as
the total number of passengers departing S01 remains constant, we could expect the
number of passengers in spoke-to-spoke markets served by the low-fare airline to
return to its initial level. In fact, the equilibrium is achieved by a major decrease in
the local traffic between S01 and H1. The number of local passengers between these
cities is reduced by 30%, from 94 to 65 passengers on average. As for the spoke-to-
spoke markets entered by the LCC, the traffic decrease is due to limited legacy
capacity as opposed to weak demand. Consequently, the average fare in S01-H1
rises from $104 to $129, or 24%.
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Fifth Legacy Market Entered SOI -S25
The analysis of the fifth market entered by the LCC confirms the conclusions drawn
from the two previous cases.
Based on Figure 27, the demand in spoke-to-spoke markets served by the LCC
surges as the LCC starts to expand its network. As a result, the capacity available for
the other markets departing from S01 is reduced, which drives the average fare up
in these markets not served by the LCC including S01-S25. As expected, the
introduction of LCC service in the market leads the average fare to a very significant
drop while the number of passengers carried by the legacy airline increases. Finally,
the gradual introduction of more LCC flights departing from S01 limits the capacity
available for the S01-S25 market, which results in smaller traffic and greater
average fare in the market.
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Figure 27: Legacy Statistics for SO1-S25 Market
d. Conclusion
On the network level, the impact of LCC entry is significant on legacy revenues. Once
the ten spoke-to-spoke markets from S01 are served by the low-fare airline, legacy
revenues are reduced by 1.2%. However, the amount of traffic carried by the legacy
carrier is slightly affected by the LCC in each market entered by the low-fare airline.
Because the LCC operates only one flight a day in these spoke-to-spoke markets, the
demand stimulation due to the 40% decrease in fares also causes the demand for
legacy flights to increase. As a result, the number of passengers departing from S01
on legacy flights remains approximately constant, while the average fare for the leg
group ex-SOI drops by 14%.
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Due to the symmetry of the legacy network, the expansion of the LCC is very
regular, i.e. increases in revenue and traffic are approximately constant for each
increment of LCC operation. By operating ten flights per day, low-fare service
generates $25,000. As compared to the total decrease of $5,800 in legacy revenue,
we conclude that aggregate revenues at the network level are enhanced by LCC
operations, which is consistent with the implementation of lower fares stimulating
demand.
On the market level, the introduction of only one LCC flight in a market boosts the
demand for both the legacy and the low-fare carrier on this route. As the legacy
carrier shares the utilization of its legs to serve multiple markets, the increasing
traffic in the market entered by the LCC limits the number of seats available for
other markets with the same origin airport. When a LCC flight is added to the
network, the limited supply of legacy seats leads to a decrease in traffic for all other
markets with the same origin airport as the new LCC flight, and an increase in the
average fare of this market. This side-effect is the achievement of the revenue
management system of the legacy carrier taking advantage of a constant demand
and a smaller supply in the market. Eventually, the LCC operating one flight in all
spoke-to-spoke markets from S01 leads to a significant decrease in the average fare
of these markets, i.e. about 30%, while stimulating the associated demands and
traffic.
4.3. LCC Frequency Analysis
In Section 4.2, the analyses at the market level confirmed that the LCC entrance
combined with a major fare decrease leads to great demand stimulation. As the base
case characteristics were determined to define an aggressive entrance scheme in
terms of fares, the LCC expansion with single frequency results in a LCC load factor
greater than 88%. Because the legacy load factor is similar, the demand in the
markets entered by the low-fare airline is likely to sustain increased LCC capacity. In
this section, the objective will be to assess the impact of increased LCC frequency at
the market level.
a. Increased LCC Frequency in SO1-S21
The frequency analysis is based on the same set of assumptions used to perform the
LCC entrance analysis with single frequency. In the markets entered, fares are
decreased by 40% and applied to the products of both the low-fare and the legacy
carrier. The initial legacy network load factor is about 87%, and the Passenger
Decision Model remains calibrated to the values determined in Chapter 3. In this
section, S01-S21 is the only market in which customers benefit from LCC
competition.
LCC frequency was gradually increased from one to three flights per day. For the
three frequency levels tested, an optimization process was followed to determine the
most appropriate LCC schedule maximizing LCC revenues. To reduce the number of
cases to test, we added one constraint to the optimization process, which states that
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a LCC flight must depart at the same time as a legacy flight. Given the results of
Section 3.4.g, this assumption is indeed the most likely to maximize LCC revenues.
First, the Decision Window Model23 was used to find the schedule maximizing the LCC
market coverage given the legacy schedule. Then, series of tests were performed to
confirm that the LCC schedule was indeed revenue-maximizing. In the end, the
following schedules were found optimal:
* single LCC frequency: LCC flight departs at the same time as the second daily
legacy flight
" double LCC frequency: LCC flights depart at the same time as the first and
the second daily legacy flight
* triple LCC frequency: LCC flights depart at the same times as the legacy
flights
Figure 28 presents the results of increased LCC frequency in S01-S21 in terms of
revenue. When the first non-stop low-cost flight is introduced in the market, the
increase in LCC revenues is the greatest. Further LCC expansion provides customers
with more non-stop travel options but the impact on LCC revenues is smaller.
Similarly, the drop in legacy revenue due to the expansion of LCC operations
decreases in magnitude when LCC frequency is higher. After the introduction of three
daily LCC flights, the legacy carrier reports a $1446 decrease in revenue for all
markets with origin S01, while low-fare flights generate $4206 in S01-S21. This
competition game with non-zero sum confirms that demand and traffic are largely
stimulated by reduced fares and increased capacity in the market.
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Figure 28: Legacy and LCC Revenue
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Total Total Total Legacy LCC T1 -t21
Legacy LCC S1-S21 Average Average Average
Traffic Traffic Traffic Fare Fare Average
_________Fare
NoLCC 16.8 / 16.8 $163.1 / $163.1Flight
I Daily 21.8 26.4 48.2 $107.1 $89.1 $97.2LCC Flight
LCC Flight 10.9 41.1 52.0 $106.2 $90.1 $93.5
3 Daily 6.8 46.1 52.9 $103.6 $91.3 $92.9LCC Flight _________
Table 32: Legacy and LCC Market Statistics in SO1-S21
Table 32 includes the results related to both traffic and average fare statistics, and
provides some insight into the competitive mechanisms involved when LCC
frequency is increased. As described in Section 4.1, the introduction of the first LCC
flight drives traffic up to 48.2 passengers on average whereas average fare
decreases by 40.4%. Then, total traffic statistics for the S01-S21 market show that
demand is only slightly stimulated by increased capacity beyond one daily LCC flight.
Indeed, the increase in total traffic is only 0.9 passenger on average when the low-
fare airline switches from two to three daily flights. Thus, the increase in LCC
revenues beyond one daily flight is mainly due to the capture of market shares from
the legacy carrier, which is illustrated by the changes in legacy and LCC traffic as
LCC flights are added. Because a core of passengers always finds more attractive to
fly the legacy carrier for various reasons such as airline preference, the capture of
market shares becomes less and less efficient as the LCC frequency is already high.
Therefore, the increase in LCC revenues by increment of LCC frequency is smaller
when the LCC operates more flights, as shown by Figure 28.
Figure 29 presents the network load factors of the legacy carrier and the LCC. Since
the total demand for the S01-S21 market reaches a plateau when the LCC increased
frequency from one to three daily flights, the LCC load factor would be stable if the
amount of legacy traffic captured could fill the new aircraft operated in the market.
However, the sharp drop in LCC load factor along the gradual introduction of LCC
flights shows that captured market shares are not high enough to fill the extra LCC
capacity available. Indeed, the LCC load factor with three daily flights is down to
50% while the initial value was 88%.
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b. Conclusion
On the market level, the LCC frequency analysis shows that the legacy load factor is
stable while the LCC load factor is greatly affected by the increase in frequency. If
the low-cost airline operates one or two daily LCC flights, its load factor stays above
69%. However, the LCC load factor is around 50% when three daily flights are
introduced in the S01-S21 market. Therefore, the double frequency case was chosen
for the frequency analysis detailed in the next sections. Indeed, the double frequency
scenario is more realistic than a LCC entering markets with a capacity leading to a
50% load factor for the new entrant airline.
4.4. 1 LCC Hublet with Double Frequency
The previous analysis of LCC expansion in Section 4.2 relied on the assumption that
only one daily LCC flight was operated in each market newly entered. Although our
base case of LCC entrance defines an aggressive LCC strategy in terms of fare
decrease, the results of Section 4.3 showed that demand stimulation was so great
that the LCC capacity could be increased to two daily flights per market.
In this section, we will again investigate the impact of a growing LCC point-to-point
network in an environment dominated by a legacy carrier, but each market entered
by the low-fare airline will be operated by two daily LCC flights. The assumptions
with regard to the initial legacy network and the entrance scenario will be the same
as in the two previous sections. The initial legacy load factor is equal to 87%, the
Passenger Decision Model is set to the same calibrated values, and a 40% decrease
in fares is implemented in all markets entered by the low-fare airline. The LCC
strategy still consists of entering spoke-to-spoke markets departing from a single
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spoke city called "hublet". However, two daily flights will be introduced in each
spoke-to-spoke market operated by the LCC.
a. Network Statistics
From the LCC hublet S01, we introduced up to twenty flights operated in ten spoke-
to-spoke markets. Figure 30 presents the revenue results of both the legacy carrier
and the LCC following the gradual introduction of LCC flights.
First, the revenue curve of the low-fare airline is quasi-linear. As in the single LCC
frequency case, this characteristic is due to the symmetry between spoke-to-spoke
markets in the network. However, the slope of the revenue curve differs from the
entrance cases presented in Section 4.2. Indeed, the increased LCC capacity allows
the LCC to gain more market share and also stimulates total market demand slightly.
With 20 daily flights in ten markets, the low-fare airline generates about $36,300 as
compared to $23,400 with 10 daily flights in ten markets.
Second, legacy revenues are shown to be greatly affected by LCC operations. Except
for the first market entered by the LCC, the impact of low-cost entrance on legacy
revenues is always negative. In the single LCC frequency case, the legacy carrier
could take advantage of network effects due to the shared utilization of legs to serve
multiple markets. In the end, legacy revenues were reduced by 1.2% when all ten
spoke-to-spoke markets from S01 were served by the LCC, but the introduction of
one LCC flight resulted in slight increases in total legacy revenue for some markets
entered. In the double LCC frequency case, legacy revenues almost always decrease
when the LCC network is expanded. Once a market is entered by the LCC, the
number of passengers carried by the legacy carrier plummets in this market. Even
with extra seats available for other markets, the legacy carrier can hardly
compensate for the losses in the market entered. Finally, legacy revenues are
reduced by 2.6% when the LCC operates 20 flights in the ten markets from 501.
As in the single frequency case, the legacy carrier achieves to maintain network
revenue when the LCC introduces its first flight in S01-S21. In fact, the first LCC
entry results in significant losses for ex-SO1 leg group of the legacy carrier, but
legacy revenues increase in the local markets linking H1 with S01 and S21, as well
as in the other spoke-to-spoke markets arriving at S21. These extra revenues
compensate for the losses experienced at the S01 intermediate level. However, as
the LCC continues to add flights departing from 501, the legacy carrier is unable to
increase revenues in the S01-Hi market as in the first entry case. Therefore, legacy
network revenues decrease following the introduction of new LCC flights.
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b. Statistics at Intermediate Level
As previously defined, the average fare of the legs ex-SO1 is the total revenue
generated by all markets with origin S01, including S01-H1, divided by the
corresponding number of passengers. Then, the load factor of the legs ex-SO1 is
defined as the average of the three legacy legs between S01 and H1. These
measures allow us to investigate the direct impacts of LCC operations in the markets
entered by the low-fare airline and analyze the network effects within the legacy
network.
Figure 31 presents the legacy average fare of the legs ex-SO1 as well as the total
number of legacy passengers in the corresponding eleven markets. Unlike the single
LCC frequency case, both reported statistics decline sharply as the LCC network
expands. The average fare and the total traffic decrease respectively by 29% and
13%, as compared to 14% and 3% when markets are entered by only one LCC
flight. Obviously, the LCC takes more passengers away from the legacy carrier,
which is consistent with the increase in LCC frequency. The total LCC capacity
available in the markets entered is much greater than in previous entry cases with
single frequency, which leads a greater proportion of passengers from 501 to book
on low-cost flights. In terms of average fare, the associated decrease is still smaller
than the 40% decrease applied to fares proposed in the markets with LCC
competition. However, the average fare decrease is much closer to the 40%
reduction applied to nominal fares. The discrepancy is here mostly due to the
protection of the S01-HI market from low-cost competition.
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As the LCC increases the number of markets operated from S01 with two daily
flights, the legacy carrier sees a continuous decrease in the load factor for the legs
ex-SO1. Figure 32 illustrates the changes in this load factor and the revenue losses in
the markets with origin S01. The LCC entrance in all spoke-to-spoke markets from
S01 results in the load factor dropping from 88% to 76%. As an increasing number
of passengers book on low-cost flights, the revenues associated with the markets
from S01 are greatly affected. In the end, the legacy carrier reports a revenue
decrease of $14,300 for the markets ex-SO1. In relation with the $12,300 decline in
total network revenue, the discrepancy shows that the legacy carrier takes
advantage of its hub structure to generate extra revenues from the seats made
available by passengers flying on LCC flights instead. In the single LCC frequency
case, these extra revenues totaled $400 while they reach $2000 in the double
frequency case. This sharp increase is consistent with the traffic statistics in the
markets entered with two daily LCC flights, which show that the aggregate load
factor for the legs ex-SO1 decreases more significantly. However, this compensation
remains partial as total revenue losses for the legacy carrier more than double as
compared the case where markets are entered with one LCC flight only.
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c. Market Statistics
At different aggregate levels, the two previous analyses show that the legacy carrier
experiences a decrease in both traffic and revenue as the LCC expands its network
with two daily flights in each spoke-to-spoke market targeted. In fact, the market
analysis shows that the legacy carrier does not seem to benefit from demand
stimulation due to the 40% drop in nominal fares, as opposed to cases with single
LCC frequency. Thanks to increased capacity, the LCC captures most of the traffic
and increases its market shares in the markets entered as shown in Section 4.3.
Figure 33 presents the average fare reported in the 501-530 market, as well as the
associated number of passengers. This market is the last spoke-to-spoke market
entered by the LCC expanding operations from the hublet 501. In the case with
single LCC frequency, SO1-S30 statistics were greatly affected by the introduction of
LCC flights in all markets with origin 501. LCC entrance resulted in a traffic boost for
both carriers in the market entered since LCC capacity was limited. This increase in
traffic put pressure on the markets not entered by the LCC and served by the same
legacy legs. In these non-entered markets including 501-S30, traffic was reduced
and the average fare increased until the LCC entered the market.
In the case with double LCC frequency, the markets with origin S01 are very stable
in terms of traffic and average fare until they are entered by the LCC. As shown by
Figure 33, the number of passengers in S01-S30 slightly oscillates around the initial
value, i.e. 17. The associated average fare presents very small changes that do not
exceed 2% about the initial average fare of $164. Once the market is operated by
the LCC, the legacy carrier reports a sharp decline of 39% in average fare and 24%
in traffic. As expected, these values are greater than the changes following the
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entrance of S01-S30 by only one LCC flight. Indeed, S01-S30 average fare
decreased by 27% while traffic increased by 12% (see Section 4.2.c).
The analysis of other markets with origin S01 eventually operated by the LCC would
present the same characteristics of stability. For instance, the SO1-S25 would report
approximately constant traffic and average fare until the number of markets entered
by the LCC reaches five. Then, the two market statistics would drop by 39% and
24% respectively, and remain approximately constant as the LCC continues the
expansion of its first hublet.
As compared to the single LCC frequency case, network effects are less complex at
the market level with increased LCC frequency. In a simple way, the LCC entrance
results in traffic and average fare decreases in all markets entered, which affects the
network performance of the legacy carrier negatively.
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Figure 33: Legacy Statistics for SO 1-S30 Market
Since a major drop in traffic was shown to occur when a spoke-to-spoke market was
entered by the LCC, a fare class mix analysis was performed to determine which
legacy fare classes were most affected by the LCC entrance, and what type of
passengers were carried by the low-fare airline. All fare class mix analyses were
performed at the market level to emphasize the abrupt changes following the LCC
entrance. As stated in Section 3.3.b, fare class 1 is the most expensive unrestricted
class while fare class 6 is the cheapest class.
First, Figure 34 presents the aggregate fare class mix related to the passengers
carried by both carriers in the S01-S21 market. The daily number of passengers is
reported by fare class and by LCC penetration level. The four groups of colored
columns present the results associated with four cases in which the number of LCC
markets differs. As soon as the LCC starts operating in SO1-S21, demand stimulation
results in traffic surges for only two booking classes, class 1 and 6. Indeed, the
number of class 6 passengers increases from 8.8 to 24.4 and class 1 bookings
almost triple from 1.3 to 3.5. On the contrary, statistics for other fare classes show
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that the associated numbers of passengers are either stable or decrease significantly,
e.g. in class 2. Thus, demand stimulation is shown to have a great impact on
passenger types, i.e. leisure and business. On one hand, the significant decrease in
the class 1 must encourage business travelers to book in the highest fare class,
which now benefits from an unrestricted status, no advance purchase requirement,
and a smaller price. On the other hand, the increase in class 6 bookings is consistent
with the demand model implemented in PODS. In Section 3.2.d, demand stimulation
was shown to be mostly due to travelers with a very low willingness-to-pay that
would not have bought a ticket if fares had been higher.
As the LCC enters new spoke-to-spoke markets from S01, the aggregate fare class
mix does not change to a great extent. In all fare classes, the number of passengers
is approximately stable. This result corroborates the previous conclusion drawn from
the analysis at the market level, i.e. network effects between markets with the same
origin S01 do not play a great role in the scenario with double LCC frequency.
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In Figure 35, the number of passengers carried by the legacy carrier is reported by
fare class and by LCC network penetration. The four groups of columns present the
results associated with four cases in which the number of LCC markets differs. Once
S01-S21 is served by the LCC, the number of passengers decreases in all fare
classes, except class 1. Indeed, the fare class mix analysis of the LCC will show that
the 40% fare decrease in S01-S21 leads to a surge in the aggregate class 1 ticket
demand for the market. As compared to the initial legacy network with no LCC
competition, class 1 tickets are much less expensive and still benefit from no
restrictions. Consequently, class 1 is very appealing to the business demand in 501-
S21. However, all business demand cannot be accommodated by the LCC as most
business travelers book at a very late stage in the booking process when many LCC
flights are already booked up. Moreover, airline preference disutility confers a
significant advantage to the legacy carrier especially for business passengers. As a
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result, the number of legacy passengers paying the highest fare increases by 23%
following the LCC entry.
The legacy carrier sells fewer tickets in all other classes including class 6. The
significant drop in reported class 6 bookings shows that a large part of the
stimulated demand due to the 40% decrease in nominal fares is carried by the LCC.
With a relatively small increase in class 1 bookings whose fares have been reduced
by 40% and significant drops in bookings for all other classes, these changes are
fully consistent with decreases in traffic and revenue reported by the legacy carrier
at the network level.
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In Figure 36, the fare class mix analysis of the LCC confirms that the low-fare airline
fills a great proportion of its capacity with passengers booking in the lowest fare
class. As a large part of these low revenue bookings must come from demand
stimulation, the LCC seems to be appealing to and willing to accept bookings from
travelers with low willingness-to-pay. On the other end of the fare structure, the LCC
reports a great number of class 1 bookings as well. Obviously, the business demand
benefits from low-cost operations by booking on the non-stop flights newly offered in
the market. Even though many business travelers have a preference for the legacy
carrier (see airline preference disutility), more than half the passengers booking in
the highest fare class opt for one LCC flight offering non-stop service and fare
classes with no restrictions.
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d. Conclusion
In Section 4.2, we focused on the analysis of an entrance scenario with one non-stop
flights operated in each spoke-to-spoke market targeted by the LCC. In Section 4.4,
as the low-fare airline steps up the aggressiveness of its expansion strategy, the
double LCC frequency defines a realistic scenario where the LCC diverts a large part
of the traffic from the legacy carrier in the markets entered.
On the market level, the total capacity of 60 seats offered by the two daily low-cost
flights accommodates a large proportion of the demand in the markets entered.
Indeed, the LCC reports market shares close to 80% in these O-D markets. The fare
class mix analysis shows that demand stimulation due to the passengers with a low
willingness-to-pay benefits primarily the LCC whose load in class 6 is great. Low-fare
non-stop service diverts demand from the legacy carrier which reports fewer
bookings in almost all its fare classes. As soon as the LCC launches service in a
market originally dominated by the legacy carrier, the market average fare and
traffic of the legacy carrier decrease respectively by 39% and 24%, and then remain
approximately stable as the low-fare airline expands further.
As the market statistics are affected to a greater extent than in the scenario with
single LCC frequency, the negative impacts of LCC operations on the legacy network
performance are expected to be more dramatic. Indeed, the introduction of non-stop
flights results in a continuous decrease in legacy traffic and revenue. Once the ten
markets with origin S01 are operated by the LCC, legacy revenues are reduced by
2.6% while the load factor for the legs ex-SO1 has decreased from 88% to 76%. In
terms of capacity, the introduction of ten LCC flights leads the low-fare airline to
offer 1.2 million ASM while the legacy carrier offers about 5.7 million ASM in the
network. As in the previous scenario, the legacy carrier takes advantage of its hub
structure to serve other markets with capacity not booked by passengers in the
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markets entered by the LCC. Yet, if we compare the losses experienced in the
markets served by LCC flights and the total revenue losses of the legacy carrier, this
network effect can generate only about 15% of total losses reported in the markets
targeted by low-fare service. Although these extra revenues are significant, the cost
paid by the legacy carrier remains very high as a result of low-cost competition in
only ten markets.
4.5. Multiple LCC Hublets
In the last phase of the symmetric network analysis, we will investigate the impact of
a LCC network operating multiple hublets. In Section 4.4, legacy revenue was shown
to decrease by 2.6% once all spoke-to-spoke markets departing from one single
hublet were served by the low-fare airline. In this section, the objective is to assess
the existence of "cascade effects" following further LCC expansion. For instance, the
impact of LCC operations on legacy revenues could prove to be non-linear or
exponential on a greater LCC expansion scale.
As in the previous section, the LCC will be assumed to opt for an aggressive strategy
and each market entered by the low-fare airline will be operated by two daily LCC
flights. The assumptions with regard to the initial legacy network and the entrance
scenario will be the same as previously. The initial legacy load factor remains at
87%, the Passenger Decision Model is set to the same calibrated values, and a 40%
decrease in fares is implemented in all markets entered. In terms of LCC expansion
strategy, the emphasis will be put on developing a low-cost network with multiple
hublets. As a starting point, the first ten markets entered by the LCC will depart from
SO0. Then, the LCC will start operations in markets originating from S02 until all
spoke-to-spoke markets are served, i.e. the number of LCC markets will be equal to
twenty. S03 will be the third hublet where the low-fare airline will expand from. In
the end, we fully simulate LCC operations from five different hublets.
Figure 37 presents the revenue statistics of both the legacy carrier and the LCC as
the number of markets entered increases. Given the symmetry of the network, the
revenue growth of the LCC airline is approximately linear as it expands operations.
This result is fully consistent with the revenue reports shown in Section 4.4 where
the progressive development of the LCC hublet S01 led to a linear progression of LCC
revenues. However, the revenue losses reported by the legacy carrier have different
characteristics. Indeed, network revenues decreased from $471,000 to $404,000, or
by 14.2%, following the introduction of 50 LCC flights in the original legacy network.
First, the proportion of network losses as compared to the initial legacy revenues is
greater than five times the legacy losses experienced by the legacy carrier when only
markets departing from S01 are entered. This result is the first indication that the
negative impact of LCC entrance may increase non-linearly as the number of
markets already served by the low-fare airline increases. Then, the comparison of
the legacy losses caused by the successive LCC hublets corroborates the preliminary
conclusion. Indeed, the incremental losses caused by the LCC hublets are a follows:
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* hublet S01-$12400 in losses
* hublet S02-$13200 in losses
" hublet S03-$12900 in losses
" hublet S04-$13100 in losses
* hublet S05-$15400 in losses
Based on the network losses reported by the legacy carrier, we identify an upward
trend that suggests the existence of cascade effects. However, these side effects
remain small in magnitude as shown by Figure 37. As the LCC network expands,
legacy revenues decrease almost linearly. These effects result from the shared
utilization of legs by the legacy carrier to serve multiple markets. In the previous
sections, we saw that the hub network operated by the legacy carrier allows it to
partially compensate for losses incurred in the markets entered by the LCC. Indeed,
the legacy airline can focus on serving other markets that do not face low-cost
competition (see Section 4.4). As the LCC expands further by developing multiple
hublets, the opportunities for such compensation diminish rapidly. We saw that
market demand for legacy flights is greatly affected by the introduction of LCC
flights. Therefore, the greater the number of LCC markets, the smaller the demand
for legacy flights and the fewer the passengers willing to book legacy seats left
empty by travelers flying the LCC. Eventually, the incremental damage caused by
one extra LCC flight on legacy revenues increases as the size of the low-cost network
increases.
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Figure 37: Legacy and LCC Revenues
In Figure 38, the load factor of both the legacy carrier and the low-fare airline are
given as a function of the number of LCC markets. As in Section 4.4, the legacy
traffic reports a continous and significant decline along the gradual LCC expansion.
Once the LCC operates in the 50 spoke-to-spoke markets originating from five
different hublets, the legacy load factor is indeed reduced from 87% to 83%. Unlike
the revenue statistics presented in Figure 37, the traffic reported by the legacy
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carrier is not characterized by an increase in traffic decline as the LCC network
increases in size. As for the LCC, the associated load factor slightly decreases from
68% to 65.5% as the number of LCC markets increases. This result is consistent
with the correlated decrease in the legacy load factor. As the traffic reported by the
legacy carrier diminishes, the capacity constraint on the legacy capacity is partially
released, i.e. the legacy carrier will be able to accommodate more passengers as the
number of full flights is reduced. Thus, a greater proportion of demand will prefer
booking a legacy flight rather than an LCC flight. Therefore, the low-fare airline
reports a slight decrease in load factor.
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Figure 38: Legacy and LCC Load Factor
4.6. Conclusion
In Chapter 4, we developed and analyzed an LCC entrance case adapted to the
symmetric network where demand stimulation was strong on the market level.
Based on a sensitivity analysis with the discount applied to nominal fares as input,
we estimated the associated increase in traffic and decrease in average fare. As our
objective was to model an entrance case with significant demand stimulation, a 4 0%
decrease in nominal fares was chosen as the base case. We showed that it resulted
in 4 0 .4 % decrease in average fare and a 200% increase in traffic in the markets
entered by the LCC.
Throughout the entry analysis, we evaluated one LCC strategy focused on the
development of hublets. The low-fare airline operated routes from a limited number
of cities on the West Coast, thus concentrating its operations in a theoretically
efficient way. Then, we modified the frequency offered by the LCC in the markets
entered and estimated the impact on reported traffic and revenues for both carriers.
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In the single LCC frequency case, the combination of strong demand stimulation and
low LCC frequency resulted in various network effects actually enhancing the
expected performance of the legacy carrier. Both carriers reported load factors
greater or equal to 87%, which suggested that LCC frequency could still be increased
to higher sustainable levels. On the market level, the introduction of one LCC flight
led to a sharp drop in average fare but also an increase in legacy traffic. As the LCC
expanded its operations from the hublet, the proportion of legacy traffic associated
with the markets with LCC competition increased as compared to the total legacy
traffic from the hublet. Consequently, the LCC entrance in a given market departing
from the hublet resulted in a legacy traffic decrease and an average fare increase in
other markets departing from the hublet. Once all ten spoke-to-spoke markets from
the hublet were entered by the LCC, the legacy traffic for the group of legs from the
hublet was approximately equal to the initial level, whereas the associated average
fare decreased by 14%. In the end, LCC operations in ten markets caused the legacy
revenues to decrease by 1.2% but did not affect the legacy load factor significantly.
In the case where the LCC doubled its frequency, the greater total capacity offered
by the low-fare airline resulted in its gaining of about 79% of market share with a
68% load factor. As a result, traffic and average fare reported by the legacy carrier
dropped respectively by 24% and 39% in the markets served by the LCC. The large
majority of new demand for low fares stimulated by the 4 0% nominal fare decrease
was shown to be carried by the LCC. Although the number of high fare class
bookings reported by the legacy carrier increased in the markets entered, the fare
decrease combined with fewer total bookings led to a 2.6% drop in network
revenues once all ten markets from the hublet were operated by the LCC. As in the
single LCC frequency case, the legacy carrier was shown to take advantage of the
hub structure of its network by serving other markets with seats that remained
empty due to passengers booking LCC flights. However, this compensated for only
15% of the revenue losses reported for the group of legs departing from the hublet,
i.e. directly affected by LCC operations.
Finally, we investigated scenarios involving greater LCC expansion with multiple
hublets. In this case, we assumed that the LCC would be aggressive by entering
targeted markets with two daily flights. As expected, the results showed that the
impact of LCC entrance on legacy revenues was greater as the size of the LCC
network increased. Indeed, the presence of LCC competition in many markets
weakens the ability of the legacy carrier to compensate for the revenue losses
incurred in the new markets entered by the LCC. Once the LCC operated 50 spoke-
to-spoke routes from five hublets, the legacy load factor decreased from 87% to
83% while its revenue dropped by 14 .2 %. In this case, the low-fare airline offered
6.0 million ASM while the legacy carrier offered about 5.7 million ASM throughout the
network.
In the symmetric network, the analysis of aggressive LCC entrance cases showed
that the legacy performance estimated both in terms of revenue and traffic was
greatly affected by low-cost operations. Moreover, network effects were shown to
play a great role in the final outcomes. As a market was offered low-cost service, the
legacy carrier reported greater revenue and traffic from passengers in markets with
no LCC competition. The objective of Chapter 5 will be to verify these preliminary
results by implementing these base cases into a more realistic and asymmetric
environment, the Network D6.
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5. Impacts of LCC Entry in an Asymmetric Legacy
Network
In Chapter 5, we will perform various LCC entry analyses in the asymmetric Network
D6 that defines a more realistic environment. As in the previous chapter, we will
gradually introduce LCC flights in spoke-to-spoke markets and analyze the traffic and
revenue changes experienced by the carriers on the market and the network level.
As described in Section 3.3.a, the Network D6 is a generic model for airline systems
with two legacy carriers operating hubs. A total of forty spoke cities are served by
legacy flights connecting at the two hubs. Between the spoke cities, each legacy
airline operates three daily connecting flights. These flights are scheduled so as to
maximize the interconnectivity of flights arriving and departing at the hubs, which
implies the existence of three banks. In terms of fares and demand levels, the O-D
markets have very different characteristics, which simulate a realistic business
environment including numerous disparities.
First, we will calibrate a base case of LCC entry. Unlike the LCC entry assumptions of
Chapter 4, we will be more conservative with regard to the global demand for air
travel within the network, the fare decrease induced by the LCC entry, and the
demand stimulation due to low-fare service in the markets entered. Then, we will
analyze the impact of the expanding LCC network on the revenue and traffic
performance of the legacy carriers. To this purpose, we will investigate two LCC
entry cases, the first with single and the second with double daily LCC frequency in
the spoke-to-spoke markets entered by the low-fare airline.
5.1. Calibration of Base Case
a. Demand Stimulation Analysis
As stated in the introduction, the Network D6 is a more realistic model of real-world
air travel demand. The two legacy carriers report load factors very close to 820%
which is comparable to the 81.2% average load factor for the entire North America
air network in March 200633. Unlike the symmetric network developed for the
purpose of the thesis, business and leisure demand vary between O-D markets in the
Network D6. However, the demand level between a spoke city and a hub always
exceeds the demand between two spoke cities. Then, the sets of fares differ greatly
between markets but result in a 4.1 average fare ratio across the entire network. In
a given market, the initial sets of fares offered by the two legacy carriers are the
same. As in the previous chapters, the legacy carriers are assumed to match the fare
structure offered by the new entrant in the markets served by the LCC. Finally, the
parameters related to the Passenger Decision Model remain calibrated to the values
determined in Chapter 3.
33 IATA Economics, Monthly Traffic Analysis, March 2006, www.iata.org/economics
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The base case will be calibrated by introducing LCC operations in the S02-S22
market (see map in Section 3.3.a). This market was randomly chosen but had to be
reasonably big in terms of demand to be sustainable for one daily LCC operation. The
mean demand levels at base fare are presented in Table 33. As compared to the
spoke-to-spoke market implemented in the symmetric network, demands for both
leisure and business travelers are greater while the associated base fares are lower.
To analyze the demand stimulation in this market, one daily LCC flight is introduced
and the associated departure time is the same as the second daily flight of the first
legacy carrier. Similar to the previous chapter, the total LCC flight time is 1h45
shorter than the legacy connecting flight with the minimum flight time in the market.
Mean Business Mean Leisure
Base Fare Base Fare Total
Demand Demand
S02-S22 8.42 15.65 24.07
Base Fare $243 $97 t
Table 33: Air Travel Demands at Base Fare
The initial fare structure and statistics for the S02-S22 market without LCC operation
are presented in Tables 34 and 35. First, the 4.5 fare ratio associated with this
market is greater than the 4.1 mean value across the entire network. Then, the load
factors of the leg groups one and two are above the 82% average load factor of the
network, which indicates that the demands in the O-D markets from S02 and to S22
are relatively high. Based on the market traffic of the legacy carriers, both legacy
carriers limit the number of S02-S22 bookings as compared to the potential demand
in the market. This behavior is driven by the high load factors reported by the legacy
carriers on the flights from S02 and to S22 as shown in Table 35. As a result, the
legacy average fares which are respectively $139 and $134 are much greater than
the leisure base fare and so limit the number of passengers that can obtain a flight
ticket in the market.
Class 1 2 3 4 5 6
Fare 393.77 276.31 163.96 138.43 112.90 87.36
Table 34: Initial Fare Structure in S02-S22 Market
Both Legacy Carriers
S02-S22 Market Average Fare Load Factor Load Factor
Traffic S02-S22 Market Legs S02-Hub Legs Hub-S22
Legacy 9.9 $139.2 87.21% 87.14%
Legacy 2 7.9 $134.0 86.95% 86.61%
LCC / / / I
Total 17.8 $136.9 / /
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Table 35: Traffic and Revenue Statistics for the S02-S22 Market
In a second case, one daily LCC flight is introduced in the S02-S22 market with no
change to the initial fare structure. The fare structure applied by the three carriers is
presented in Table 36, and the market statistics associated with this LCC entry case
are included in Table 37. As indicated by the respective market traffic, a significant
number of passengers book the LCC flight which represents a 71% market share. A
large part of the S02-S22 traffic is diverted from the two legacy carriers which report
much smaller loads as compared to the previous case with no LCC competition.
Simultaneously, both the legacy average fares increase in the market even though
the number of legacy passengers decrease. As in the previous Chapter, the legacy
carriers can remain aggressive in closing low-fare classes in S02-S22 early in the
booking process because they benefit from the shared use of the legs from S02 and
to S22. In fact, the load factors for the legs S02-Hub and Hub-S22 even increase as
the LCC enters its first market. The loss of legacy traffic due to LCC competition is
compensated by travelers booking in other markets departing from S02 and arriving
at S22. The hub structure allows both the legacy carriers to achieve greater average
fares in the market entered, which are respectively $40 and $32 higher than the
$105 LCC average fare.
On the S02-S22 market level, the LCC entry increases the capacity offered in the
market to a great extent. As expected, this leads to a significant increase in the total
number of bookings and a drop in the average fare based on the three carriers'
statistics. Total market traffic is 24.6 on average which is slightly greater than the
total mean demand at base fare. This result is explained by the class 6 fare lower
than the leisure base fare and therefore stimulating demand to a small extent. Then,
the market average fare is down from $137 to $116 as compared to the previous
case. As opposed to the legacy average fares in S02-S22, the LCC reports a much
smaller average fare in the market. The LCC has a much weaker pricing power than
its competitors benefiting from the hub structure. Indeed, the low-fare airline has a
58% load factor which limits the opportunities for the LCC to close the lowest fare
classes early in the booking process, and thus increase the average amount of
money paid per passenger.
Class 1 2 3 4 5 6
Fare 393.77 276.31 163.96 138.43 112.90 87.36
Table 36: Initial Fare Structure in S02-S22 Market
Legacy Carriers and LCC
S02-S22 Market Average Fare Load Factor Load Factor
Traffic S02-S22 Market Legs S02-Hub Legs Hub-S22
Legacy 4.1 $144.7 87.46% 87.61%
Legacy 2 3.2 $136.7 87.70% 87.45%
LCC 17.4 $105.0 58.01% /
Total 24.6 $115.6 / I
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Table 37: Traffic and Revenue Statistics for the S02-S22 Market
Then, we simulated the introduction of one LCC flight in the S02-S22 market with
respectively a 20%, 30%, and 40% decrease in fares. Tables 38 and 39 present the
set of fares and the statistics associated with a 3 0% fare decrease that was
determined to be most relevant to further analysis. The criteria are based on
sufficient and realistic traffic stimulation due to fare decrease, as well as the
consistency of the fare decrease with observations of LCC entries within the US air
network over the past few years'.
As compared to the first case with no LCC competition, the average fare is reduced
by 41%, which leads to a 157 % increase in traffic. The demand stimulation is
smaller than in the symmetric network, but still significant and consistent with the
results of the Perry analysis3 2 . With one single daily offered by the low-fare airline,
the LCC load factor is about 8 7 % up from 5 8 % in the previous case with no fare
reduction. In terms of traffic, the legacy carriers benefit from both the demand
stimulation and the limited LCC capacity, thus reporting greater loads than in the
initial case. As the LCC load factors increase, the number of days for which the LCC
flight is booked up increase, thus reducing the market share of the low-fare airline
down to 57%. The legacy average fares in the S02-S22 are significantly reduced to
respectively $100 and $96. However, they still far exceed the LCC average fare
thanks to the shared use of the legacy legs from S02 and to S22 within the two hub
systems.
Class 1 2 3 4 5 6
Fare 275.80 193.20 114.80 96.60 79.10 60.90
Table 38: Initial Fares Decreased by 30% in S02-S22 Market
Legacy Carriers and LCC
S02-S22 Market Average Fare Load Factor Load Factor
Traffic S02-S22 Market Legs S02-Hub Legs Hub-S22
Legacy 10.9 $99.6 87.02% 87.07%
Legacy 2 8.7 $96.0 87.15% 86.73%
LCC 26.1 $68.5 86.98%
Total 45.7 $81.1 I /
Table 39: Traffic and Revenue Statistics for the SO2-S22 Market
b. Conclusion
In the asymmetric Network D6, the demand stimulation analysis is consistent with
the results obtained in the symmetric network. As the LCC introduces its first flight,
the total traffic carried in the market increases due to the increased capacity
available. A large part of the travelers book the LCC flight which has a significantly
lower average fare than its legacy competitors. As opposed to the LCC, the legacy
carriers take advantage of the hub structure to maintain their average fares at a high
level in the market entered. When the LCC combines the entry with a 30% decrease
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in fares, the demand stimulation affects the traffic statistics of the three carriers. All
carriers report greater loads but the LCC market share decreases as its capacity is
limited in the market served. Simultaneously, the average fares of all three carriers
plummet. However, the legacy average fares remain higher than the LCC average
fare as many passengers in different markets with no LCC competition are competing
to book the same legacy flights serving the market entered by the low-fare airline.
In this analysis, we show that fare decreases have different impacts in the symmetric
and the asymmetric network. While a 40% decrease in the set of nominal fares leads
to a 40.4% decrease in total average fare in the symmetric network, the 300/
decrease in nominal fares results in a 4 0% decrease in total average fare in the more
realistic Network D6. Then, the 40 % fare decrease does not stimulate market
demand in Network D6 as much as in the symmetric network. These conclusions
should not be generalized as the demand stimulation analysis was performed on a
market that differs from all the others in the Network D6. However, the results show
that the modelization of demand stimulation is more conservative in the Network D6,
which was the objective stated in the introduction of Chapter 5.
Based on the results given by the sensitivity analysis with the fare decrease as
variable, and the benchmarks provided by LCC entry analyses32, we will select the
case where the initial set of fares is decreased by 3 0% as the base case for further
investigation.
5.2. 1 LCC Hublet with Single Frequency
In this section, we will investigate the traffic and revenue impact of a LCC entering
spoke-to-spoke markets with one daily flight. The LCC will start to expand its
operations from a single city S16 located on the West Coast (see map in section
3.3.a). As in the symmetric network, the "hublet" strategy is assumed to be the
most efficient by achieving a significant a degree of operational concentration for the
low-fare airline.
The departure city S16 is the primary LCC target since the largest number of the
spoke-to-spoke markets with the greatest demand depart from this city. As for the
order of entrance, the spoke-to-spoke markets originating from S16 were entered
based on their demand level. LCC operations were first introduced in the market with
the greatest demand, followed by the market with the second greatest demand, and
so on. In the end, the LCC offers service in fifteen out of the twenty spoke-to-spoke
markets departing from S16. As in the previous section, the two initial legacy load
factors are about 8 2 % and the Passenger Decision Model remains calibrated to the
values determined in Chapter 3. In the markets provided with low-fare service, the
LCC flight departs at the same time as the second daily flight of either the first or the
second legacy carrier, which differ only slightly. Finally, nominal fares are reduced by
30% as calibrated by the demand stimulation analysis.
Even though the Network D6 is asymmetric and demand levels differ between each
O-D market, the network is consistent with a business reality that sees the greatest
demand levels concentrated in the biggest cities. Thus, the spoke-to-spoke market
with the greatest demand will always have S22 as destination for any departure city
considered. In fact, the ranking of the arrival cities according to their respective
97
travel demands is the same for all departure cities. This remark also applies to the
hub-to-spoke markets departing from H1 and H2.
a. Network Statistics
In the initial Network D6, we gradually introduced up to fifteen LCC flights departing
from S16 to fifteen different cities. Figure 39 presents the total revenues of the three
carriers operating in the network.
As opposed to LCC entry simulated in the symmetric network, the increase in LCC
revenue is not quasi-linear, which is consistent with the entry pattern followed by the
low-fare airline. Indeed, the markets with the greatest demands are entered first. As
these high demand markets generate the most revenues for the LCC, the increase in
revenue is reduced as the number of cities already served by the LCC increases.
When fifteen markets are provided with low-fare service, the LCC reports total
revenues of $35,350. In this case, the legacy carriers produce about 12.5 million
ASM while the low-fare airline only 892,800 ASM.
Then, the interpretation of the revenue changes reported by the legacy carriers is
less straightforward than for the LCC. Overall, LCC operations in fifteen markets
result in a $10,000 decrease in aggregate legacy revenues that initially totaled $1.88
million. However, the revenues of both legacy carriers go up and down as the LCC
gradually expands its network. On the intermediate level, the analysis presented in
the next section will show that the aggregate revenues for all markets departing
from S16 continuously decrease as the number of markets entered increases. In
fact, the irregularities of legacy revenue changes are due to the interaction of the
entered markets with the O-D markets departing from the two hubs. All these
markets are served by the same legs departing from the hubs and all passengers
willing to book a flight in these markets compete for the same seats. As a result, the
LCC introduction in a spoke-to-spoke market also affects the revenue performance of
both legacy carriers in the markets with H1 and H2 as origin.
Along the LCC expansion, the analysis of the legacy revenues associated with the
markets departing from the hubs does not reveal any particular pattern. In some
entry cases, the revenues in the hub-to-spoke market with the same arrival city as
the market entered increase. In other cases, the associated revenues decrease.
However, the variation of the revenues for all markets departing from the hub is
always much greater than the change affecting the hub-to-spoke market with the
same arrival city as the market entered. From these observations, we infer that the
interactions are complex and involve the entire set of markets departing from the
hubs. Moreover, the revenue management systems of both legacy carriers also play
a great role in these revenue changes. Indeed, the market analysis will show that
the LCC introduction results in a slight increase in the traffic for both legacy carriers
in the market entered. Paradoxically, LCC introduction with a single flight in markets
with high demand does not free seats for other markets in the legacy networks due
to the significant demand stimulation. However, the associated extra demand affects
the revenue management systems which achieves higher average fares in some
markets served, thus changes the overall revenue performance of the legacy
carriers.
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Figure 39: Legacy and LCC Revenues
b. Statistics at Intermediate Level
As in section 4.2, we introduce one measure related to the "legacy legs ex-SO1"
which is slightly adapted to the Network D6. The aggregate legacy average fare of
the legs ex-SO1 is defined as the total revenues of both legacy carriers generated by
all markets with origin S01, including S01-H1 and S01-H2, divided by the
corresponding number of passengers. This measure will allow us to investigate more
aggregate impacts of expanding LCC operations.
Based on Figure 40, the legacy carriers report an intuitive decrease in the aggregate
legacy average fare for the legs ex-S16. When all fifteen markets are served by the
LCC, the legacy average fare is reduced by 9% from $168 to $153. This decrease is
small but consistent with the entry scheme taken by the LCC entering markets with
only one flight a day. The market analysis will show that it results in a slightly
greater number of bookings for both legacy carriers in these markets. This allows the
legacy carriers to reduce the drop in the average fare of the market entered due to
the discount applied to nominal fares. It also allows the revenue management
systems of the legacy carriers to maintain an equivalent pricing pressure on the
other markets served by the same legs since the associated load factors do not
decrease.
In terms of traffic, the number of bookings reported by the two legacy carriers
slightly decrease with the number of cities entered. Once the fifteen biggest markets
from S16 are served by the LCC, the number of bookings is reduced by 4% from 519
passengers initially. As stated in the previous paragraph, the LCC entry with only one
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daily flight leads to a slight increase in the traffic for both legacy carriers in the
market entered. Therefore, the slight decrease in traffic reported at the intermediate
level must be the achievement of the legacy revenue management systems limiting
the number of bookings in the markets from S16 to maintain the associated average
fares at a high level.
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Figure 40: Aggregate Legacy Revenue and Traffic for Legs ex-S16
Figure 41 presents the LCC total revenue and traffic associated with the group of
legs ex-S16. The LCC average fare slightly varies around $91 as the low-fare
network expands. In fact, the changes in the aggregate LCC average fare are due to
the characteristics of the markets entered which have different average fares in the
Network D6 with no low-cost competition. For instance, the second market entered
by the LCC is S16-S26. As shown by Figure 41, this entry results in a significant
increase in the aggregate LCC average fare from $94 to $101. In fact, the initial
average fare of S16-S22 is $209 whereas the initial average fare is only $139 in the
first market entered S16-S22. Then, the LCC traffic increase is regular but not linear,
which is consistent with the entry pattern followed by the low-fare airline. Indeed,
the markets with the greatest demands are entered first. As these high demand
markets generate the most traffic for the LCC, the change in revenue is reduced as
the number of markets already served by the LCC increases.
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Figure 41: LCC Average Fare and Traffic
c. Statistics at Market Level
As in the symmetric network, the legacy statistics on the intermediate level are
significantly weakened by the introduction of LCC service in the spoke-to-spoke
markets departing from S16. Both the average fare and the load factor for the legs
ex-SO1 decrease as the low-fare network grows. The analysis of the legacy traffic
and revenues on the market level will provide the keys to understand these trends.
Moreover, LCC introduction in the symmetric network resulted in unexpected
changes including the increase in the average fare of the markets not entered by the
LCC but with the same origin as the markets with low-fare competition. In the
Network D6, the market analysis will show whether these trends are observed in a
different and more realistic environment.
First Market Entered S1 6-S22
Figure 42 presents the traffic and revenue statistics for both legacy carriers in the
first market entered. Following the introduction of LCC service, the number of legacy
bookings increases from about 21 to 25 daily bookings on average. This change is
due to the great demand stimulation following the 30% decrease in nominal fares,
combined with the limited capacity offered by the low-fare airline. The new entrant
reports a 92% load factor when it operates only in S16-S22 with one flight a day,
which gives the opportunity to both legacy carriers to maintain their loads in the
market newly entered.
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As for the market average fare reported by the legacy carriers, both airlines suffer
from the 30% decrease in nominal fares following the LCC entry. The aggregate
legacy average fare drops by more than 22% from $171 to $132. Even though the
initial level of legacy traffic increases in S16-S22, the change in average fare affects
the revenue performance of the legacy carriers to a great extent, which can be
observed at the intermediate level (see Figure 40). At the market level, the total
revenues can be estimated by multiplying the number of passengers in S16-S22 by
the average fare. Similarly, this can be done at the intermediate level to estimate
the revenues generated by all markets with origin S16 including S16-H1 and S16-
H2. While the losses caused by the first LCC entry total $290 at the market level, the
revenues losses on the intermediate level are only $190. As in the symmetric
network, the shared use of legs in hub systems allow the legacy carriers to put some
extra pricing pressure on the markets served by the same legs as the market
entered, thus reduce revenue losses.
However, the further introduction of single daily LCC flights in additional markets
departing from S16 led to a significant increase in the S16-S22 legacy average fare
in the symmetric network. In the Network D6, this increase is barely noticeable. The
average fare increases by less than 1% between the two cases with respectively one
and fifteen LCC markets. As compared to the symmetric network, the increase in
traffic is smaller in the markets entered by the low-fare airline in the asymmetric
network. Therefore, the constraint on the available legacy capacity is less binding in
Network D6, which puts less pricing pressure on the markets departing from the
hublet developed by the LCC.
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Market Not Entered S16-S21
S16-S21 is the market with the fourth smallest demand among the spoke-to-spoke
markets departing from S16. As the LCC enters only fifteen out of the twenty spoke-
to-spoke markets from the hublet it develops, legacy operations never compete with
low-fare service in S16-S21. However, the traffic and revenue statistics of the legacy
carriers change when the LCC expands from its first hublet, as shown by Figure 43.
Based on the analysis of the S16-S22 market, legacy traffic in a market entered by
the LCC increases slightly. As the low-fare network grows, these increments in
legacy traffic are constrained by the limited capacity of the legacy carrier, however.
This implies that all the potential demand cannot be accommodated by the two
legacy carriers, which then use their revenue management systems to limit demand
by increasing average fares. This trend is illustrated by figure 43 showing a slight
decrease in the S16-S21 aggregate legacy traffic from 15.6 to 14.6 bookings on
average. Simultaneously, the S16-S21 legacy average fare increases from $193 to
$198. As compared to the results obtained in the symmetric network, the changes
are much smaller in Network D6 but are consistent with the previous analyses in the
symmetric network and the specifics of the asymmetric environment.
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d. Conclusion
On one hand, the LCC entry in fifteen spoke-to-spoke markets from S16 has a
significant impact on the aggregate revenue of the two legacy carriers. This
aggregate revenue is reduced by 0.55% when all fifteen markets are served by the
low-fare airline. The changes in total legacy revenue caused by each increment of
LCC operations are variable and highly depend on the market entered. The analysis
shows that network effects have a great impact on the final outcome in terms of
revenue, specifically the changes affecting the markets departing from the two hubs.
Overall, the LCC entry in the fifteen spoke-to-spoke markets results in reduced
legacy revenues.
On the other hand, we infer from the analysis that the traffic levels of both legacy
carriers are not threatened by the LCC offering only one daily flight in the markets
entered. On the contrary, the market traffic statistics of the legacy carriers are even
shown to increase in the markets where the low-fare airline starts its operations due
to the significant demand stimulation. If the traffic of the two legacy carriers
decreases for the group of legs ex-S01, this is only the result of the legacy revenue
management facing an increased demand for legacy flights and reacting by limiting
the number of bookings to rise the average fare as much as feasible. Therefore, the
LCC entry scheme with one daily flight is a threat the revenue streams of the legacy
carriers, but does not jeopardize the viability of the hubs in terms of traffic.
For the single frequency case, the conclusions drawn from the Network D6 analysis
are similar to the LCC entry outcomes analyzed in the symmetric network. Although
the changes are more difficult to identify within the increased noise produced by the
size and the asymmetry of the Network D6, we determined common characteristics
between the LCC entry cases in the two networks. The objective of the next section
will be to determine whether the two networks present the same characteristics
when the low-fare airline enters spoke-to-spoke markets with two daily flights.
5.3. 1 LCC Hublet with Double Frequency
In section 5.2, the entry analysis is based on the assumption that the LCC enters
spoke-to-spoke markets from a single departure city with only one daily flight. In
this section, we will investigate the traffic and revenue impacts of a different LCC
strategy. As in the previous analysis, the LCC will enter spoke-to-spoke markets
from a single departure city, S16, but the low-fare airline will introduce two daily
flights in these markets.
The assumptions related to the initial legacy network, the Network D6, and the
Passenger Decision Model will remain the same as previously calibrated. Initially, the
legacy load factors are both close to 8 2% and all legacy flights connect at the two
hubs, H1 and H2. In the markets entered, the set of nominal fares will be reduced by
30% as calibrated by the demand stimulation analysis in section 5.1. As for the
schedule of the low-fare airline, the two LCC flights will depart at the same as the
second and the third flight of either the first or the second legacy carrier. In a
preliminary analysis, the results were indeed shown not to be very sensitive to the
choice of either one of the legacy carriers. However, the LCC decision to pick up
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departure times close to the second and the third legacy daily flights remains for the
LCC one of the most revenue-enhancing schedule in Network D6 (see section 3.4.g).
a. Network Statistics
In the initial Network D6, we introduce up to thirty flights in markets departing from
S16. As in section 5.2, the spoke-to-spoke markets with greatest demands are
entered first. Figure 44 presents the revenue results of the three carriers operating
in the network.
First, the decision made by the LCC to enter the markets with two daily flights results
in increased LCC revenues as compared to the single frequency case. However, the
increase is far from doubling its network revenues. With fifteen markets served by
the low-fare airline, the double frequency leads to 45% increase in LCC revenue from
$35,500 to $51,200. Thus, the increased LCC capacity must result in a decreased
network load factor for the low-fare airline, which is only 60% when thirty flights are
operated from S16 as compared to the 88% load factor obtained with fifteen flights.
Then, figure 44 shows that the changes in LCC revenue greatly rely on the demand
of the market entered as the LCC expands its network. In the single frequency case,
the LCC revenue curve was not linear but quite rectilinear. On the contrary, the
increase in LCC revenue is greatly reduced in the double frequency case when the
low-fare airline enters the last spoke-to-spoke markets with the lowest demands.
While the first market generated about $4,400, the incremental revenue associated
with the last of the fifteen markets entered is only $2,600.
Finally, the patterns of the legacy revenue curves are very similar to the single
frequency case. In some entry cases, legacy revenues increase whereas they
decrease when the LCC enters other spoke-to-spoke markets from S16. As described
in Section 5.2, the interactions are complex and mainly involve the entire set of
markets departing from the hubs. Overall, total legacy revenues are reduced by the
LCC introduction in fifteen markets to a greater extent than in the single frequency
case. As compared to the previous 0.55% decrease in aggregate legacy revenues
with fifteen LCC flights, they are reduced by 0.8% when the fifteen markets entered
are served with two flights operated by the low-fare airline.
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b. Statistics at Intermediate Level
As in section 5.2.b, we introduce and analyze two measures related to the "legacy
legs ex-S01". The first measure, the load factor of the legs ex-SO1, is defined as the
average of the six legacy legs between S01 and the two hubs H1 and H2. The
second, the legacy average fare of the legs ex-SO1, is defined as the total legacy
revenues generated by all markets with origin 501, including S01-Hi and S01-H2,
divided by the corresponding number of passengers.
Figure 45 presents the aggregate legacy revenues and the traffic statistics associated
with the legs ex-S16. As opposed to the single frequency case, the number of legacy
passengers carried in the markets ex-S16 is approximately constant along the
gradual introduction of LCC flights. In fact, the market analysis will show that traffic
statistics are heavily reduced by the two daily LCC flights in the spoke-to-spoke
markets entered. However, the extra seats left by passengers flying LCC are booked
by passengers in the spoke-to-hub markets arriving at HI and H2. Thus, the
aggregate traffic levels reported by both legacy carriers are not affected by the LCC
introduction although the mix of passengers across the markets ex-S16 changes.
While the aggregate legacy average fare was reduced by only 9% in the single
frequency case, this measure decreases by about 20% from $168 to $134 in the
double frequency case. Several factors are involved in the drop of the aggregate
legacy average fare. In the markets entered, the nominal legacy fares are reduced
by 30% as a matching response to the prices offered by the new entrant. Then, the
introduction of two daily LCC flights captures a great market share, which leads to a
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reduction in the loads carried by the two legacy carriers in the markets entered. This
traffic decrease drives the average fare down even further. Finally, the traffic
statistics at the intermediate level show that the total number of passengers carried
from S16 is approximately constant. As explained in the previous paragraph, the
legacy airlines maintain their loads in the markets ex-S16 thanks to more seats
available to passengers traveling to the hubs. However, this increase in spoke-to-hub
traffic can be only achieved by a decrease in the average fare paid by these
passengers, which contributes to the decrease in the aggregate legacy average fare
for the legs ex-S16.
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Figure 45: Aggregate Legacy Revenue and Traffic for Legs ex-S16
Figure 46 presents the LCC average fare and traffic for all the markets entered from
S16. As expected, the increase in the LCC capacity leads to greater traffic levels.
Thus, the total number of passengers carried by the low-fare airline is 532 on
average while the total LCC traffic with fifteen spoke-to-spoke markets was only 394
in the single frequency case. In terms of average fare, the associated curve is
characterized by the same pattern as observed in section 5.2.b. The average fare is
approximately constant with some variations due to the specifics of the markets
entered. For instance, the second market entered S16-S26 drives the LCC average
fare up since the original average fare in the Network D6 with no LCC competition is
very high. However, the LCC average fare is slightly greater than in the single
frequency case. With two LCC flights operated in fifteen markets, the final LCC
average fare is $96.4 while it was $89.6 in the previous analysis. We can infer that
the revenue management of the LCC plays a great role in this average fare increase.
Indeed, the LCC revenue management is designed to make trade-offs between
decreasing the average fare which would increase the load factor, and increasing the
average fare thus limiting the number of bookings. As we saw that the LCC load
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factor is significantly reduced when markets are entered with two daily flights, Figure
46 illustrates the fact that increasing the load factor is not always sought by a
revenue management system expected to maximize revenues.
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Figure 46: LCC Average Fare and Traffic
c. Statistics at Market Level
On the intermediate level, the analysis of the legacy statistics shows that the
aggregate average fare is significantly reduced while traffic is approximately
constant. As in the single frequency case, the analysis of the aggregate legacy
average fare and traffic on the market level will allow us to understand the
mechanisms driving the prices and the number of bookings in the markets entered.
Moreover, the previous analyses revealed unexpected changes including the increase
in the average fare of the markets not entered by the LCC but with the same origin
as the markets with low-fare competition. In the double frequency case, the further
investigation of the different types of markets will determine whether these trends
are confirmed when the LCC pursues a more aggressive entry strategy.
First Market Entered S1 6-S22
Figure 47 presents the aggregate legacy average fare as well as the traffic in the first
market S16-S22 entered by the LCC.
As compared to the single frequency case, the changes in legacy traffic are radically
different. While the legacy traffic increased in the markets entered by the LCC with
only one flight, the demand stimulation is not great enough to fill two LCC flights and
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maintain the legacy loads in the markets served by the low-fare airline twice daily.
As a result, the number of S16-S22 passengers carried by the two legacy carriers is
reduced by 42% from 21.3 to 12.3 on average when the two LCC flights are
introduced in the market. As the LCC network grows, the legacy traffic in this market
increases slightly from 12.3 to 13.7 on average. In fact, this increase results from
the cumulative effects of decreased traffic in the markets entered. On the
intermediate level, we saw that the legacy revenue management systems achieve
constant legacy traffic for the legs ex-S16. As any LCC entry with two daily flights
results in decreased legacy traffic in the market, this means that the traffic in the
other markets departing from S16 are managed so that the associated legacy traffic
levels increase. This effect is illustrated by figure 47 showing an increase in the
market traffic following the second LCC market entry.
Unexpectedly, the increase in legacy traffic is combined with a decrease in the
aggregate legacy average fare for the market from $142 to $133 following the
second LCC entry. Indeed, the average fare is the main means used by the legacy
revenue management systems to regulate the demand for legacy flights in a given
market. As the LCC network grows, the total demand for legacy flights departing
from S16 decreases. To defend their market share, the legacy airlines are forced to
put less pressure on fares, which leads to traffic increases and average decreases.
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Market Not Entered S16-S21
Unlike the S16-S22 market, S16-S22 is not entered by the LCC since it has one of
the lowest demand levels among the spoke-to-spoke markets departing from S16.
Figure 48 presents the traffic and aggregate legacy average fare associated with this
market.
In the single frequency case, the traffic was shown to decrease and the legacy
average fare to increase when the low-fare airline introduced new spoke-to-spoke
markets from S16. In the double frequency case, the changes in the market legacy
statistics are opposite. As the LCC network grows, the legacy average fare decreases
by 10.3% from $194 to $174. In terms of traffic, the number of legacy passengers
increases from 15.5 to 18.4 on average following the first LCC introduction. These
changes are fully consistent with the changes observed in the S16-S22 market after
the second LCC introduction. As the low-fare airline enters spoke-to-spoke markets,
the legacy revenue management systems decrease the average fare in the other
markets from S16 to increase the associated traffic and thus maintain the legacy
traffic on the intermediate level.
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d. Conclusion
In section 5.3, the analysis of the double frequency case confirms the conclusions
drawn from the LCC entry simulation in the symmetric market.
First, the revenues of the two legacy carriers are more reduced when the low-fare
airline enters spoke-to-spoke markets with two daily flights as opposed to only one.
In section 5.2, we see that aggregate legacy revenues decreased by 0.55% while
they are reduced by 0.8% when the LCC enters fifteen markets departing from S16
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with two daily flights. As in the symmetric network, the network revenue losses
experienced by the two legacy carriers are lower than the losses generated in the set
of markets entered by the LCC. We show that the markets to and from the two hubs
play a great role in compensation for the losses reported at the intermediate level.
Overall, this revenue compensation remains partial as shown by the $15,000
decrease in aggregate network revenue of the two legacy carriers when the LCC
operates in fifteen spoke-to-spoke markets.
Then, we determine that the legacy average fare in the markets ex-S16 is much
more affected by the LCC entries in the double frequency case as compared to the
single frequency scenario. Indeed, the legacy average fare associated with all
markets ex-S16 decreases by 20% while it is reduced by only 9% when the fifteen
markets ex-S16 with the greatest demands are entered with only one daily flight.
However, the results show that the traffic at the intermediate level does not
decrease as the LCC network grows. The loss of bookings due to passengers booking
LCC flights is compensated by legacy traffic carried in other markets departing from
S16. In this case, the markets arriving at the two hubs again play a great role in
maintaining the initial legacy traffic levels on the legs from S16.
Finally, the market level analysis shows that the two daily LCC flights capture too
great a market share in the markets entered to allow the legacy traffic levels to
remain constant. In the spoke-to-spoke markets served by the low-fare airline, the
traffic carried by the two legacy carriers is reduced by between 30% and 40%
depending on the market considered as compared to the initial legacy traffic level.
This conclusion is although the demand is greatly stimulated by the 30% decrease in
nominal fares.
5.4. Multiple LCC Hublets
As the last part of the Network D6 analysis, we will investigate the impact of a LCC
operating multiple hublets. In Section 5.2 and 5.3, we determined that the
aggregate revenue of the two legacy carriers decreased by 0.55% and 0. 8 % when
the low-fare airline entered spoke-to-spoke markets from a single hublet with
respectively one and two daily flights. The decrease in the legacy network traffic was
negligible and could not lead to any conclusion since the low-fare airline operated
only up to fifteen markets as compared to 482 O-D markets that compose the
Network D6. In this section, the objective is to assess the existence of "cascade
effects" following further LCC expansion. As the LCC network grows, the negative
changes in legacy revenues and traffic could increase, i.e. the ability of the legacy
carriers to replace connecting with local hub traffic would be limited.
a. Single Frequency Case
In Section 5.4.a, the LCC entry will be modeled as in section 5.2 but the number of
spoke-to-spoke markets entered will be up to 150 departing from ten different
hublets. The ten departure cities where the LCC expands its operations from have
the greatest demands associated with the spoke-to-spoke markets of the Network
D6. The low-fare airline will gradually enter these markets with one daily flight
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departing at the same time as the second flight of alternatively the first and the
second legacy carrier. The overall demand level in the Network D6 will be set up
such that the initial load factors of the two legacy carriers are close to 8 2 % (as in the
previous sections), and the parameters of the Passenger Decision Model will remain
as calibrated in section 3.
Figure 49 presents the revenues of the three carriers operating in the network as the
LCC expands its operations. First, the LCC revenue curve is not linear. The positive
change in LCC revenue is greater when the LCC network is small. The incremental
revenue generated by the first five markets entered is $12,500 while it is only
$5,100 for the last five markets. This decrease is consistent with the pattern of
market entry adopted by the LCC. Indeed, the first markets entered have the
greatest demand potential as compared to the last ones. Thus, the traffic and
associated LCC revenues in the latter will be smaller than in the former. Then, the
revenues of both legacy carriers are greatly affected by the LCC entries in 150
spoke-to-spoke markets within the network. The aggregate revenues associated with
the two legacy carriers are reduced by 5.6% when 150 markets are served by the
low-fare airline. As compared to the 0.55% decrease in aggregate legacy revenue
determined in section 5.2, the multiple hublet analysis shows that there is no
significant cascade effects in terms of legacy network revenue associated with the
single frequency case. The decrease is indeed ten times greater than the revenue
drop experienced by the legacy carriers when the size of the LCC network was ten
times smaller.
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In Figure 50, the load factors of respectively the two legacy carriers and the LCC are
shown. The load factors of the two legacy carriers remain constant as the size of the
LCC network increases. In section 5.2, we showed that the legacy traffic increased in
the markets served by the low-fare airline. Therefore, the constant legacy load
factors observed in this section are consistent with the results given by the previous
analysis of LCC entry with single frequency. Moreover, the load factor of the LCC is
shown to decrease from 90.4% to 77.1% as the size of its network increase from 5
to 150 markets. As was true for the decrease in the incremental LCC revenue, this
observation is related to the pattern of market entry chosen by the LCC, which
enters the spoke-to-spoke markets with the greatest demand first.
In conclusion, the multiple hublet analysis with single frequency shows that legacy
revenues are greatly reduced by the expansion of LCC operations to 150 markets,
but no significant cascade effects applied to legacy revenues are observed, and the
traffic carried by the legacy airlines does not decrease as the low-fare airline grows.
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Figure 50: Legacy and LCC Load Factors
b. Double Frequency Case
In a second case, the LCC enters up to 145 spoke-to-spoke markets with two daily
flights. Its strategy of expansion is still based on the development of hublets where
the LCC concentrates its operations. As in the previous section, the low-fare airline
will start service from the ten different departure cities with the greatest demand
levels in the Network D6. The city with the greatest demand will be entered first,
etc... In the end, thirty daily LCC flights will be operated in fifteen spoke-to-spoke
markets from each hublet, except for the last hublet which will have LCC service in
ten markets only. As for the schedule, the first daily LCC flight will depart at the
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same time as the second flight of alternatively the first and the second legacy
carrier. The second daily flight will depart at the same time as the third flight of
alternatively the first and the second legacy carrier (see Section 5.3 for further
explanation on schedule optimization). All other parameters will remain as calibrated
in the previous section.
Figure 51 presents the revenues of the legacy carriers and the LCC operating within
the Network D6. First, the increased LCC capacity results in greater revenues for the
low-fare airline as compared to the single frequency case (see Section 5.4.a). When
the LCC operates in 145 markets, its revenues are $383,900 while total LCC network
revenues were only $285,000 with single daily frequency. In terms of ASM, the
number is doubled from 7.5 million to 15 million between the single and the double
frequency case. The LCC output level can be compared to the number of ASMs
produced by the two legacy carriers, each of them reporting 12 million ASMs. As in
the previous section, the incremental increase in LCC revenue due to new market
entries is reduced as the size of the LCC network increases. This result is consistent
with the LCC pattern of market entry focusing first on the markets with the greatest
demand.
Then, the revenue curves of the two legacy carriers present similar characteristics as
in the single frequency case. As the LCC expands its network by increment of five
markets, the legacy revenues experience slight oscillations due to network effects. In
section 5.3, we explained the great role played by the markets arriving and
departing from the two hubs in regulating the traffic and revenues of the legacy
carriers by providing extra traffic. The existence and the persistence of these effects
are confirmed by Figure 51. However, the amplitude of the revenue oscillations tend
to decrease as the size of the LCC network increases. The demand of the markets
from and to the hubs being limited as in any other market, it must be more difficult
for the legacy carriers to rely on local hub traffic to compensate for traffic and
revenue losses due to LCC entry, which leads to a reduction of the oscillations.
As compared to the single frequency case, the revenues of the legacy carriers are
affected to a greater extent. While the aggregate revenues of the two legacy carriers
were reduced by 5.2%, the more aggressive LCC entry strategy results in a 7.4%
decrease in these revenues. In the double frequency cases, the revenue decrease is
equivalent to about $490 in daily losses for both legacy carriers in each of the 145
markets entered by the LCC. This result is consistent with the market analysis
performed in section 5.4.c where both traffic and average fare were shown to drop in
the markets entered by two daily LCC flights. Although other markets including from
and to the hubs can compensate for the losses experienced in these spoke-to-spoke
markets, this can be only partial.
Then, the 7.4% decrease in aggregate legacy revenues shows the absence of
cascade effects when the LCC enters up to 145 markets with two daily flights. The
reduction in aggregate legacy revenues was already 0.8% when only fifteen markets
were entered by the LCC (see section 5.4), which is about a tenth of the legacy
revenue decrease when the LCC operates in 145 markets. Since the ratio of the
revenue decreases and the number of markets entered are almost equal, no cascade
effect plays a significant role in this scenario.
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Figure 51: Legacy and LCC Load Factors
Figure 52 presents the load factors of the three carriers operating in the network. On
one hand, the great capacity introduced by the LCC in every market entered results
in a continuously decreasing load factor as its network expands. With operations in
five markets, the LCC load factor is about 70% whereas the low-fare airline hardly
reaches a 50% load factor with 145 markets operated. On the other hand, the load
factors of the two legacy carriers are only very slightly reduced by the massive LCC
entry. Both load factors decrease by less than 2% once the LCC serves the 145
markets targeted. As described in section 5.4.b, the extra demand available in the
markets from and to the hubs, as well as demand stimulation in the markets entered
allow the legacy carriers to maintain their loads. However, the legacy revenues are
still greatly affected by the LCC entry.
In conclusion, the results of the double frequency case corroborate the findings of
the analysis performed in the symmetric network. The more aggressive LCC strategy
diverts more traffic from the legacy carriers, thus affects the legacy revenues to a
greater extent and leads to greater revenues for the low-fare airline. However, the
viability of the hub in terms of traffic does not seem to be threatened by this LCC
entry scenario. The legacy carriers can rely on both the remainder of the customers
in the markets entered by the LCC, and the great local demand from and to the hubs
to feed their hubs.
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5.5. Conclusion
In Chapter 5, we analyzed the traffic and revenue impacts of a LCC entering point-
to-point markets in a realistic environment, the Network D6. In this network, all
markets have different characteristics with regard to both the fares implemented in
the market and the demands, which defines an asymmetric network. Initially, the
two legacy carriers operate two major hubs with load factors of 82% very close to
the levels reported by the US airline industry recently. We developed a base case of
LCC entry by analyzing demand stimulation and chose a 30% decrease in nominal
fares following the introduction of low-fare service. In the market analyzed for
demand stimulation purposes, the demand stimulation was shown to be smaller than
in the symmetric network. After nominal fares were decreased in a market randomly
selected, the average fare was reduced by about 40% while traffic increased by
157% as compared to about 200% in the symmetric network.
In the single frequency case, the findings related to the traffic and revenue impacts
were very similar to the conclusions drawn from the analysis in the symmetric
network. Overall, both legacy revenues were negatively affected by the LCC entries
on the aggregate level, even though we observed significant oscillations in these
revenues. Once the LCC operated in 150 markets departing from ten hublets, the
aggregate revenues of the two legacy carriers were reduced by 5.6% while the
associated load factors of the legacy carriers were still about 82%. On the market
level, we showed that the LCC entry with only daily flight resulted in a significant
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increase in both legacy carriers' traffic in the market entered. As in the symmetric
network, this change had an impact on the other markets departing from the same
hublet as the legacy capacity on the corresponding legs was limited. Therefore, we
observed a slight increase in the legacy average fare and a moderate decrease in
legacy traffic in these markets as the LCC expanded its network. However, the
changes were smaller than in the symmetric network, which is consistent with the
smaller demand stimulation modeled in the Network D6. The analysis of the multiple
LCC hublet scenario showed that legacy revenues were greatly reduced by LCC
competition in numerous markets, and the downward trend was regular and
unaccelerated in spite of small oscillations due to network effects. Unlike the
symmetric network where the negative changes in legacy revenues were shown to
slightly increase as the LCC network size increased, the decrease in legacy revenues
was very regular when the low-fare airline enters up to 150 markets with one daily
flight in Network D6.
In the second frequency case, the results corroborate the findings of the analysis
performed in the symmetric network as well. On the market level, the increased LCC
capacity led to a greater LCC market share in the markets entered as compared to
the single frequency scenario. The aggregate legacy traffic was reduced by between
30% and 40 % in the markets served by the low-fare airline. Consequently, the
revenue management systems of the two legacy carriers lost some power to manage
high fares from the passengers willing to book in markets departing from the hublet
developed by the LCC. On the intermediate level, these changes resulted in a
significant reduction in the average fare for the legs ex the hublet. While the
decrease in average fare was only 9% in the single frequency case, it was 2 0% when
fifteen markets ex the hublet were operated by the LCC with two daily flights. In all
the markets departing from the LCC hublets, the aggregate legacy average fare was
eventually reduced. Overall, legacy revenues were greatly affected by the LCC
entries with double frequency as shown by Table 40. With 145 markets entered, the
LCC produced 15 million ASMs as compared to 12 million for each legacy carrier, and
led to a 7.4% decrease in aggregate legacy revenues. Nevertheless, the load factors
of the two legacy carriers were shown to remain approximately constant as the LCC
expanded its operations. In fact, the traffic lost by the legacy carriers in the markets
entered was compensated by local traffic from and to the hubs. This shift in the local
vs. connecting traffic mix was done at the expense of the legacy revenues, but the
traffic levels of both legacy carriers were thus stabilized. Finally, the revenue analysis
of the multiple hublet scenario showed the lack of cascade effects as in the single
frequency case.
Finally, the simulation of low-fare entry in the Network D6 shows that LCC
competition threatens the revenues but not the traffic levels of the legacy carriers on
the network level. Demand stimulation, legacy schedule convenience, the preference
for legacy airlines, and local hub traffic are key factors enhancing legacy traffic in an
environment where low-fare offer is increasing. However, the revenues of both
legacy carriers are badly reduced by the overall expansion of the LCC. The "matching
fares" assumption, as well as the traffic decrease in the markets entered by the low-
fare airline with two daily flights contributes to the drop in legacy yield. Although the
viability of the hubs in terms of traffic is unlikely to be comprised by increased LCC
competition, the profitability of the legacy carriers will certainly be affected due to
smaller revenues if their costs remain high. These conclusions are confirmed by the
two LCC entry scenarios considered in Chapter 5, the single and the more aggressive
double LCC frequency case.
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Legacy
Carrier
1
Legacy
Carrier
2
ASMs
No LCC
(Base Case)
12,267,966
15 Markets
Entered
Single LCC
Frequency
12,267,966
15 Markets
Entered
Double LCC
Frequency
12,267,966
150 Markets
Entered
Single LCC
Frequency
12,267,966
145 Markets
Entered
Double LCC
Frequency
12,267,966
RPMs 10,102,966 10,101,275 10,117,039 10,074,327 10,010,645
Load Factor 82.35% 82.34% 82.47% 82.12% 81.60%
% Change
vs Base / -0.01% 0.15% -0.28% -0.91%
Case
Revenues $944,457 $939,033 $936,524 $889,704 $873,461
% Change
vs Base I -0.57% -0.84% -5.80% -7.52%
Case
Yield ($) 9.35 cents 9.30 cents 9.26 cents 8.83 cents 8.73 cents
% Change
vs Base
Case
ASMs
/I
12,739,530
-0.53%
12,739,530
-0.96%
12,739,530
-5.56%
12,739,530
-6.63%
12,739,530
RPMs 10,433,881 10,426,247 10,423,433 10,416,971 10,256,303
Load Factor 81.90% 81.84% 81.82% 81.77% 80.51%
% Change
vs Base / -0.07% -0.10% -0.16% -1.70%
Case
Revenues $937,151 $932,304 $929,697 $884,986 $868,820
% Change
vs Base / -0.52% -0.80% -5.57% -7.29%
Case I I I _I
Yield ($) 8.98 cents 8.94 cents 8.92 cents 8.50 cents 8.47 cents
% Change
vs Base
Case
I -0.45% -0.67% -5.35% -5.68%
ASMs / 892,580 1,785,160 7,626,828 15,087,037
RPMs / 783,320 1,061,418 5,880,432 7,555,499
LCC Load Factor / 87.76 59.46 77.1 50.08
Revenues / $35,353 $51,298 $290,306 $383,916
Yield ($) / 4.51 cents 4.83 cents 4.94 cents 5.08 cents
Table 40: Summary of Traffic and Revenue Results
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6. Conclusion and Future Research Directions
6.1. Summary of Findings
The objective of this thesis was to investigate the traffic and revenue impacts of a
low-cost carrier (LCC) developing non-stop routes in a hub network system
dominated by legacy carriers. Based on recent trends of the airline industry, we
explained the relevance of such a competitive scenario. A literature review allowed
us to determine the assumptions related to passenger choice between paths, fare
classes, and airlines such that the LCC entry model would be realistic. Following a
description of the mechanisms involved in the Passenger Origin Destination
Simulator (PODS), we calibrated the simulator so it could integrate the assumptions
defined earlier. We then developed two simulation environments, a symmetric and
an asymmetric network. In both environments, we studied the traffic and revenue
changes experienced by the incumbents and the new entrant as a result of the
expansion of LCC operations.
In the first part of this thesis, we reviewed the development of hub systems. With
the US airline industry as a case study, we showed that the schedule convenience,
the concentration of operations, and the benefit of serving multiple O-D markets with
legs connecting at the hub, were the main factors involved in the growth of hub
operations. Then, we described the success of low-cost carriers that have
experienced an exponential growth in the last ten years. The reshaping of the airline
industry with new entrants coming in with extremely low fares changed the behavior
of customers with regard to flight booking. We analyzed the most recent studies of
passenger decision models based on disutility costs that could be implemented in the
PODS simulator. Customer surveys showed that any kind of disutility cost was
greater for business than for leisure traffic. Moreover, the analyses concluded that
significant disutility costs were associated with flight connection, yet legacy carriers
benefited from customer preference due to some perks such as the miles earned via
loyalty programs. Thus, we were provided with the critical parameters necessary to
model LCC entry in PODS.
In the second part of the thesis, we described the PODS environment including the
two networks used for simulation purposes, the symmetric network and the
asymmetric network (Network D6). We presented the concepts associated with
airlines' booking systems and passenger decisions with regard to flight booking, both
key elements of the PODS simulation. Since the Passenger Decision Model is based
on a generalized cost function involving disutility costs associated with trip
characteristics, we calibrated it to account for the specificities of LCC entry. In the
symmetric network, we simulated an LCC entering a market with one daily flight. The
literature review provided not only the order of magnitude of disutility costs, but also
the expected markets share of the airlines in such a scenario. Based on these well
defined constraints, all critical parameters were calibrated through a sensitivity
analysis.
We then simulated LCC entry in the symmetric network and analyzed the associated
traffic and revenue impacts. We performed a demand stimulation analysis that
showed demand was significantly boosted when fares were reduced. Since our intent
was to model LCC entry in a stimulated demand environment, we chose to
119
implement a 40% decrease in nominal fares in the markets entered by the low-fare
airline. As a result, the average fare was shown to decrease by about 40.4% and the
total traffic to increase by 200% in the spoke-to-spoke market operated by the LCC.
Table 41 summarizes the results associated with the two LCC entry scenarios tested,
the single and the double LCC frequency case. When the LCC entered spoke-to-spoke
markets with only one flight a day, demand stimulation was so strong that the traffic
carried by the legacy carrier increased in these markets despite LCC competition, but
the market average fares plummeted. We showed that other O-D markets were also
greatly affected by the LCC entry when their origin was the departure city of the new
LCC flights. Indeed, the traffic in these non-LCC markets was constrained by the
legacy capacity due to the demand surge in the markets newly served by the LCC,
which led to unexpected increases in some market average fares even in non-LCC
markets. Overall, legacy revenues were shown to be greatly reduced by LCC
operations although legacy load factor increased, and average fares increased in a
limited number of markets. The introduction of fifty LCC non-stop flights resulted in a
7.9% decrease in legacy revenue while the legacy load factor increased by 1. 7 %
from 87%.
In the double LCC frequency case, the greater capacity offered by the low-fare airline
captured more traffic in the markets it entered, which prevented the legacy carrier
from maintaining its load factor. Consequently, the negative impact on legacy
revenue was strengthened by the significantly lower demand for legacy flights. No
increase in legacy average fare was reported in any market as was observed in the
single frequency case. In the spoke-to-spoke markets served by the LCC, the loss in
legacy traffic was shown to be replaced by local hub demand, but this compensation
was only partial and also led to average fare decreases in these local hub markets
used to feed the hub. Eventually, legacy revenues were shown to be greatly affected
by LCC double frequency operations in fifty markets as they were reduced by 14.2%.
Simultaneously, the legacy network load factor decreased from 8 7 % to 82.3%. This
confirmed the LCC competition affected legacy traffic negatively, but was more a
threat to the legacy revenue streams than the total number of passengers carried by
the legacy airline.
10 Markets Entered 10 Markets Entered 50 Markets Entered 50 Markets Entered
Single LCC Double LCC Single LCC Double LCC
Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency
Change in
Legacy Load 0.71% -0.99% 1.69% -4.67%
Factor
Legacy ield -1.90% -1.58% -9.39% -10.02%
Change in
Legacy -1.23% -2.63% -7.94% -14.24%
Revenues
Table 41: Summary of Changes in Total Network Statistics for the Legacy Carrier
Symmetric Network
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Finally, the realistic Network D6 was used to corroborate the results obtained in the
symmetric network. Based on a demand stimulation analysis, a 30% decrease in
nominal fares was implemented in the markets entered by the LCC. In Network D6,
demand stimulation depends on the characteristics of each market entered in which
two legacy hub carriers compete originally. The level of stimulation was shown to be
generally weaker as compared to the symmetric network, but significant and
consistent with observations of real LCC entry cases.
Two LCC entry scenarios were tested, the single and the double LCC frequency case.
In the former, the changes in the revenue and traffic of both legacy carriers were
shown to have similar properties as in the symmetric network. In the markets
entered, demand stimulation led to increases in legacy traffic while the average fare
dropped. To a smaller extent, we observed the same unexpected increases in
average fare for the markets not entered but departing from the new LCC hublets.
Overall, the load factors of both legacy carriers were barely changed by the
introduction of LCC service in up to 150 markets, fluctuating around the original 82%
value as the low-fare airline expanded. Although partially compensated by network
effects including average fare increases in local hub markets, aggregate legacy
revenues were significantly reduced by up to 5.7%.
As expected, increased LCC capacity allowed the new entrant to gain a greater
market share in the markets entered. However, both legacy carriers were shown to
efficiently take advantage of demands in the markets to and from the hubs, thus
replacing the traffic lost in the markets entered. As shown by Table 42, the
aggregate legacy load factor decreased by only 1.3% when 145 markets were served
by the low-fare airline. In the double frequency case, LCC entry caused the average
fare to decrease not only in the market entered but also in all markets with the same
origin or the same destination as the newly introduced LCC flights. As a result,
aggregate legacy yield was shown to be reduced by up to 6.4%, which led to a 7.4/0
decrease in aggregate legacy revenues.
15 Markets Entered 15 Markets Entered 150 Markets Entered 145 Markets Entered
Single LCC Double LCC Single LCC Double LCC
Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency
Change in
Aggregate Legacy -0.05% 0.02% -0.22% -1.31%
Load Factor
Change in
Aggregate Legacy -0.50% -0.88% -5.46% -6.38%
Yield
Change in
Aggregate Legacy -0.55% -0.82% -5.68% -7.40%
Revenues
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Table 42: Summary of Changes in Aggregate Network Statistics for both Legacy
Carriers
Asymmetric Network (D6)
To conclude, all the results presented in the thesis demonstrate that hub systems are
very resilient in terms of traffic load factors when facing extensive and aggressive
LCC competition. As low-fare service is expanded in non-stop routes, legacy carriers
can rely on connecting traffic in other markets and local demand departing and
arriving at the hubs to replace the traffic captured by the new entrant. Nevertheless,
this occurs at the expense of the average fare in these local hub markets, which
adds up to the significant losses reported in the markets entered due to the traffic
captured by the legacy carrier and the significant decrease in nominal fares. As a
result, legacy revenues are greatly reduced in a massive LCC entry scenario,
whereas legacy load factors are only slightly affected even in the most aggressive
case with regard to LCC network size and frequency.
In the LCC entry scenarios tested, the size of the low-fare network was increased to
a point where the new entrant offered more ASMs that any incumbent. In the real
world, such cases are rare although Southwest reported the greatest number of
domestic enplanements within the US in January 2006. In the thesis, the LCC entry
analysis referred to only one low-fare airline. In fact, this approach was chosen to
simplify the presentation of the results but not to exclusively model the competition
of a unique LCC. The same framework of analysis could be applied to non-stop low-
fare entry led by multiple LCCs simultaneously, and similar conclusions would be
drawn as for the impact on legacy traffic and revenue.
6.2. Future Research Directions
The first suggestion for future research directions is to investigate the role of the
Revenue Management systems in LCC entry. In this thesis, we assumed that legacy
carriers and the low-fare airline used the same RM methods with regard to demand
forecast and optimization algorithms, i.e. a traditional leg-based RM system based on
EMSR controls. Recently, several more advanced methods have been developed and
are currently used by network airlines to maximize their revenues even further. For
instance, the Displacement Adjusted Virtual Nesting (DAVN) method is an O-D based
optimization algorithm which discriminates local vs. connecting bookings. This
method allows the airline to better select requests for bookings on connecting flights
that may displace two non-connecting bookings usually generating more revenue.
The implementation of these advanced RM systems is generally a long and expensive
process, which explains why most low-fare airlines do not make use of these
advanced RM systems. Therefore, it would be relevant to consider an LCC entry
scenario in which the legacy airlines use more elaborate RM systems, and determine
whether the traffic and revenue impact of LCC entry are significantly changed in this
case.
Second, we assumed in the thesis that the legacy carriers matched the fare structure
of the new entrant in all the markets entered. This assumption could be challenged
especially for the highest fare classes. By testing LCC entry scenarios where the
legacy carriers would keep the original fare structure, or reduce fares to a lower
extent than the LCC, we would be able to better understand the legacy trade-off
between higher fares and greater market share.
Finally, the resilience of legacy hub systems facing LCC competition was shown to
greatly rely on strong demand in the markets from and to the hubs. The combination
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of low-fare entry in spoke-to-spoke markets and spoke-to-hub markets may
significantly change the outcomes of LCC entry. The analysis of such a scenario could
show that hub networks might be weaker than assessed in this thesis.
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